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PRELHHNARY MEMORANDUM 
Summer List 11, Sheet J 
No. 80-?100-AFX 
ROGERS et al. (countv 
commissioners) 
v. 
LODGE et al. (class of 
black residents) 
CA 5 (Jones, Fay; 
C!issenting) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
SUMMARY: Whether a countv's system of at-large elections 
unconstitutionally "dilutes" the voting rights of black residents 
of the county. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELmv: Burke County is a large (8 32 
sq. miles), predominantly rural county in Georgia. The 
population of the county is about 10,000, a slight majority of 





declining. (Plaintiffs maintain there is no Jnnqer a black 
majority of voting ~ residents.) About 38% of the registered 
voters in the county are black. / 
The county is governed by a five member Board of 
Cornrnissj_oners, and hy various committees appointed by the 
commissioners. As mancaten hy state statute (Ga. Laws l9Jl, 
p.390), all five commissioners are elected at the same time, for 
four year terms. Candidates for commissioner must run for 
~ ~ 
specific numbered posts (although there are no subdistrict 
residency requirements for a specific post) and be elected hv 
v 
majoritv vote. Ga. Code Ann. ~~34-1015 & 1413. Run-off 
elections are held in the event no candidate achieves a majority. 
V'No black has ever been elected as a commissioner. 
This suit was brought as a class action on behalf of all 
black residents of Burke County, who aJleqe that t~e method of 
selecting commissioners dilutes the relative strength of their 
votes, in violation of their First, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendment rights. Plaintjffs sought division of the 
county into single member districts. 
The DC (C~J. Alaimo, S.D.Ga.) held that the election scheme, 
although racially neutral when adopted jn 1911, is being 
..., ,. -maintained for "invidious pur _oses". In support of this 
conclusion, the DC made the followinq findings: 
1) There is a history of discouraging registration of black 
voters in the countv. Prior to passage of the Voting Rights Act, 
devices such as poll taxes, literacy tests, and white primaries 
kept registration of black voters at about 6.8% of those 
eligible. Prior to commencement of this suit, voters could 
register at~nly one Jocation in the county, which made 
registration difficul.t for the manv hlack residents without ready 
access to transportation. 
2) In the few instances when blacks have been candidates for 
commissioner, voting has proceeded largely along racial lines. 
Bloc voting has also been evi~ent in elections for the city 
council of Waynesboro, the county seat. ~~~ 
3) Blacks are virtually ~eluded from participation in the 
/ 
powerful Burke County Democratic Committee. 
4) The county commissioners have been~nresponsive to the 
needs of black residents. There have been only token 
appointments of blacks to countv committees. Roads in the county 
./ 
have been paved in a racially discriminatory manner, with paving 
often stopping at the point v..rhere a concentration of black 
res ide nee s beg ins. The commissioners have retained svmbols of 
the county's history of racial ~iscrimination, such as the 
/ 
V "coloreds" and "whites" toilet signs and the "Nigger-hook" at the 
countv courthouse. 
5) The "socio-economic" status of blacks in the county is 
depressed, and their level of education lags behind that of 
whites. 
The DC concluded from the ahove findings that blacks were 
"denied access to the political process" in the county, and that 
plaintiffs had made out a case of unconstitutional voting 
dilution. It ordered that the county be divided into five 
districts, each of which would elect one commissioner, and 
adopted a districting plan submitted by plaintiffs. It further 
ordered a special election of the five commissioners at the same 
time as the Nov. 1978 general election. Prior to the 1978 
,, 
election, while the case was pending before CA 5, Justice Powell 
granted a stay of the DC order. 
HOLDING BELOW: The CA 5 affirmed the DC, holding that 
plaintiffs had established both Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendment violations. The CA noted that the DC had relied 
heavily on a "test" for determining unconstitutional voting 
dilution set out in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (CAS 
1973), which v1as subsequentJy c'liscredited in Mobile v. Bolden, 
446 u.s. 55 (lC\80). (Zimmer held that unlawful voting dilution 
could be presumed from an "aggregate" of factors such as a 
minority group's lack of access to political processes, 
unresponsiveness of elected representatives to minority 
interests, and the effects of past discrimination on minorjty 
participation in the electoral process.) Nevertheless, theCA 
found that the DC had anticipated Mobile's explicit requirement 
of a demonstration of "discriminatory purpose" in voting dilution 
cases, and had made findings sufficient to support its conclusion 
that the Burke County at-large election system was being 
maintained for the purpose of minimizing the political impact of 
black voters in the county. The CA further held that while the 
presence of Zimmer factors in a voting dilution case is no longer 
determinative of a Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment violation, 
it is still "indicative" of intentional discrimination in 
maintenance of an at-larqe election system. 
J. Henderson, dissenting, thought the case should be 
remanded to the DC for reconsideration in light of Mobile. 
CONTENTIONS: Appellants contend 1) the CA erred in 
concluding that purposeful discrimination had been shown, and in 
using the Zimmer factors to create an "inference" of such 
discrimination; 2) the CA erred in not remanding to the DC for 
further findings in light of Mobile; 3) the CA erred in holding 
that voting dilution can be the basis of a Fifteenth Amendment 
violation; 4) the doctrine of voting dilution is inapplicable to 
county governing bodies; 5) assuminq a constitutional violation, 
the DC's relief is inappropriate. 
Appellees contend that the CA accurately appliAd the 
principles established in Mobile, and that remand was unnecessary 
because the DC findings were sufficient to establish purposeful 
discrimination in maintenance of the election system. They 
maintain that appellants nir not challenqe the DC's factual 
findings before the CA. They also contend that the relief 
ordered was limited and reasonable, in that it noes not affect 
the basic composition or responsibilities of the commissioners, 
and does not alter the structure of county government. 
DISCUSSION: Jurisdiction for the appeal is established by 28 
u.s.c. §1254 (2), since theCA held that the Georgia statutes 
governing Burke County election procedures were repugnant to the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The case does not appear 
appropriate for summary disposition. 
The only major issue is whether the lower courts correctly 
applied principles established in Mobile--and particularly the 
requirement of a showing of intentional discrimination--to thP. 
facts of this case. However, no opinion in Mobile commanded a 
majority of the Court, and this case would provide an opportunity 
for clarification of the principles applicable to constitutional 
challenges to at-large election schemes. Moreover, while the 
disposition of the case below was somewhat fact-specific, the 
facts found by the DC here seem more highly indicative of 
.. 
- 6 -
intentional discrimination than those in Mobile. This case may 
be a good vehicle for further explication of the extent to which 
"discriminatory purpose" i.n voting dilution cases may be inferred 
from a record which lacks a "smoking gun". 
An interesting wrinkle is the fact that the CA sustained the 
voting dilution claim even though blacks constitute a maioritv of 
the residents in the county. However, blacks constitute a 
minority of the registered voters in the countv, a circumstance 
the DC found attributable to official discouragement of black 
voting registration. Thus, the black population majorHv ma y not 
be a dispositive factor. 
I would note probal)le jurisdiction. 
There is a motion to dismiss or affirm. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Dick Fallon 
DATE: February 19, 1982 
RE: No. 80-2100, Rogers et al. v. Lodge et al. 
Question Presented 
The question is whether the plaintiffs carried their 
burden of proving discriminatory intent in the maintenance of 





In this bobtail memo I address only the central problem of 
this case: the criteria for identifying "discriminatory intent" 
behind State-structured voting districts. Viewed in isolation, 
I would be very surprised if this for you were a hard case. 
The large principles now are clear. @ At-large voting 
districts are not ~ se unconstitutional. E.g., City of 
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 u.s. 55 (1980) ("Mobile"); White v. 
Regester, 412 u.s. 755 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 u.s. 124 
(1971). @ In order to invalidate an at-large scheme under 
the constitution, a plaintiff must show "discriminatory ___ __..,__. 
intent." See Mobile, supra (plurality opinion of Stewart, J., 
joined by the Chief, LFP, and WHR; dissenting opinion of BRW). 
Nor do I think you would find much difficulty in applying 
these principles to the facts of this case. In finding 
discriminatory intent in this case, both the district court and 
the court of appeals relied almost exclusively on the kinds of 
factors expressly held insufficient in Justice Stewart's 
opinion in Mobile. The district court in fact 
reliance on the same factors as those 
by the lower courts in Mobile--the so-called ~::t: 6-~ See Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (CAS 1973), a 
~-'· ~ nom East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 u.s. 636 
~ (1976). (The district court did, however, make a clear 
~~~ finding, not only that the factors were present, but there was 
~i-t "discriminatory intent.") Under the Zimmer test the "primary• 
~ factors ~lude (1) the group's access to political processes, 
~( (2) esponsiveness of elected representatives to the 
-- ~~ \fAJp~ ,, 
II ? 
3. 
group's interests, (3) the importance of the state policy 
supporting at-large di str icting, and ( 4) the effects of past 
discrimination upon the group's participation in the political 
system. See 485 F.2d, at 1305. The test also recognizes 
"secondary" or "enhancing" factors, which are more specific to 
a particular set of facts. In this case the court of appeals 
~'(!/" I tried to save the Zimmer test by giving a very narrow reading ? to Mobile. It construed Mobile to hold only that proof of 
~~ these f~ctors would not create a necessary or irrebuttable 
~r- ' presumpt1on of discriminatory intent. See App., at 38-39. In 
('/'/ 
a particular case, proof of the factors could still suffice. 
Thus, reasoning that the district court had only used the 
factors as part of a more situation-sensitive inquiry, the 
court of appeals found the existence of discriminatory intent 
---------------~-------- ----
on the facts presented. In my view, Justice Stewart's 
plurality opinion--which you joined--fairly can be read as 
establishing that more direct and specific proof of intent must 
be provided. Mere sociological facts will not do. See 446 
U.S., at 73-74 (discounting the probative value of each of the 
four factors on which the district court had relied). Thus, in 
Mobile, Justice Stewart dismissed reliance on the Zimmer 
factors in the following way: 
(1) No black ever had been elected to the city commission, 
but "It may be that Negro candidates have been defeated, but 
that fact alone does not work a constitutional deprivation." 




( 2) The district court found that the commission 
discriminated against Negroes in employment, but "evidence of 
discrimination by white officials in Mobile is relevant only as 
the most tenuous and circumstantial evidence of the 
constitutional validity of the electoral system under which 
they attained their offices." Id., at 74. 
(3) There was a long local history of segregation, but 
"past discrimination cannot, in the manner of original sin, 
condemn government action that is itself unlawful." Id. 7 
(4) Other factors of the voting system, apparently 
disadvantageous to blacks, "tend naturally to disadvantage any 
voting minority" but were not in ~hemselves evidence of 
discrimination against a particular group. Id. 
Obviously which these were 
\ 
fact-specific conclusions, 
could be altered on the different facts of a different case. 
But in this case the same logic would seem to apply with equal 
validity. If there is any strong basis for distinction, it 
would be that the district court here found discrimination 
against blacks in the operation of the Democratic party--few 
blacks elected to attend political conventions, etc. Again, 
however, by the logic of Mobile this is only "attenuated" 
evidence of discriminatory intent in maintaining a system of 
voting districts in-place since 1911. Moreover, if there is 
request for direct challenge to the actual illegalities, rather 
than a relatively unconnected lawsuit against the natur~ of 
the county's electoral districts. As the cited evidence does 
•. 
.. ,. ·~ .. . .
5. 
not show directly that local officials kept the voting system 
in order to disadvantage blacks, there is no real difficulty in 
knocking down this arguable basis for distinction. (In 
attempting to distinguish this case, appellees rely mainly on 
two basis: (a) Unlike Mobile, this case does not involve the 
invalidation of an entire form of municipal government; but 
this factor, while relevant to the question of the appropriate 
judicial remedy, is irrelevant to intent; and (b) the the 
district court here did not indulge the presumption that proof 
of the factors necessarily would prove discrimination, but saw 
the factors only as identifying relevant evidence; as the above 
discussion indicates, however, Justice Stewart•s opinion--which 
you joined--seems to me to go further.) 
Thus, to summarize, I think that your Mobile position--
applied to this case--would almost surely mandate a vote to 
reverse. The record of local discrimination arguably is 
marginally worse. (In addition to the sociological and 
economic data, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
pointed out that a "Niggerhook" still hangs in the courthouse, 
and it seems clear that discrimination in the provision of 
municipal services remains pervasive.) On the other hand, the 
/ blacks in this case are an absolute majority of the residents 
of the county (about 60%), and apparently comprise slightly 
over 50% of those of voting age. This evidence makes it less 
clear how--in a "causal" sense-- blacks are disadvantaged by 
at-large voting. 
--------.... 
underlying this case of course is that--in a situation 
involving an historic form of government arguably producing 
"vote dilution"--there seldom if ever will be a "smoking gun." 
Does this mean that the Court is destined to fight out--in a 
long sequence of cases--whether a particular set of facts does 
or does not evidence deliberate intent to dilute the vote of 
minority groups? Should it mean that intent to "dilute" 
minority votes never could be proved? 
The background to this case may be illuminating. In 
Mobile Justice White dissented, mostly on the basis of his 
Court opinion in White v. Regester, supra. In my view Justice 
~/white had a powerful argument from precedent. In Regester v. 
White the Court upheld a finding of intentional vote dilution 
in a redistricting case, relying entirely on a district court's 
inferences from the same sort of factors present both in Mobile 
and again in this case. In White v. Regester the Court 
indicated a strong disposition to trust the fact-finding of the 
District Court, in deference to its proximity to the relevant 
facts. See 412 u.s., at 769: "Based on the totality of the 
circumstances, the District Court evolved its ultimate 
assessment of the multi-member district, overlaid, as it was, 
on the cultural and economic realities .•.. [It held] from its 
own special vantage point ••. [relying on the district court's] 
findings, representing as they do a blend of history and an 
intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of the Bexar 






Merely by granting the present case, the Court has 
signalled how its view has changed since White v. Regester. No 
longer does it want "an intensely local appraisal of design and 
impact , " 412 U • S . , at 7 7 0 • If it did, the findings of the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals would not need to be 
tested here. 
As I understand it, ~ since White v. Regester the Court 
has grown wary of local appraisals out of respect for two 
principles: 
(1) It is fundamentally the business of the States to 
structure their own governments. There is hardly a more 
intrusive role for federal courts than to tell States how to 
govern themselves. 
(2) Even if the courts did wish to fight against vote-
dilution--for it seems indisputable both (a) that the 
phenomenon occurs and (b) that it is morally wrong--there are 
no judicially manageable standards to apply in this area. Once 
setting down this road, it is hard to stop short of quotas and 
group representation. 
At the same time, it still seems clear enough that the 
Court would need to do something in a case where there really 
was a "smoking gun"--unambiguous proof of discriminatory intent 
in a particular case. 
Thus, if this case is to serve any useful law-guiding 





could not, as the plurality did in Mobile, merely say: (a) 
purpose must be proved specifically, rather then presumed under 
8. 
some formulaic test; and (b) it is not proved here, because it 
is hard to prove. 
Trying to view the problem from your perspective, I think 
two alternatives may merit your consideration: 
(1) Focus on the question: Whose intent? This is an 
approach suggested by Justice Stewart's Mobile opinion but not 
emphasized. See 446 u.s., at 74 n.20: "Among the difficulties 
with the District Court's view of the evidence was its failure 
to identify the state officials whose intent it considered 
relevant " This approach would bar repeated review of 
"attenuated" economic and sociological evidence. And, though 
best applied to "action" rather than "inaction", it could be 
applied at least in some situations of failure to act. Cf. 
your opinion in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. 





Move in the direction of ~Ste:ns ·~ 
At first blush, Justice Stevens seems 
opi~ in 
to take a 
absolutely antithetical to that 






from cases involving direct barriers to voting--a helpful and 
important distinction, for--as he emphasizes--the difficulty of 
proof should be very different as between them. Then, with 
regard to "vote dilution" cases, he says that subjective 
discriminatory intent is not relevant. See 446 u.s., at 90. 
Justice Stevens prefers rather to em hasize three "objective" 
factors: (1) the "routineness" of a political decision--the 
more unusual a voting structure, the more suspect; (2) the 
;'· ~ 
9. 
impact on minority groups; and (3) the presence or absence of a 
neutral justification. 
In my view the interest of Justice Stevens's approach lies 
in the objective factors that he chooses. Upon examination, it 
becomes plain that each is most important as an "index" to 
"intent." There is no reason to care about the unusual or non-
routine shape of a voting district--as Justice Stevens does--
unless you think that a very peculiar shape is likely to 
indicate ulterior purposes. Nonetheless, in an area of this 
delicacy in the federal system, it may be prefer able to talk 
about "odd shapes" rather than "corrupt" or "bigoted" 
legislators. 
Without agreeing with Justice Stevens that "intent" should 
be abandoned as the ultimate criterion, I think that his three-
factor approach might provide the basis for some positive 
guidance from this Court to the lower courts. In other words, 
with appropriate references to the significance of context, it 
might be helpful to identify and suggest the central relevance 
of factors directly involving the structure of the voting 
scheme--factors such as "innocent" or "suspect" appearance, and 
the presence or absence of a neutral justification. As noted 
above, in Mobile the plurality criticized the Zimmer test as 
drawing "attenuated" inferences--inferences from evidence, such 
as distributions of wealth and other benefits, not on their 
face related to the question in issue. Emphasis on more direct 
-----------------------factors would alleviate this concern. These factors also would 
provide a presumption in favor of upholding at-large electoral 
10. 
districts. As emphasized in Mobile in the opinions both of 
Justices Stewart and Stevens, they are very common. See 446 
U.S., at 60 n.7: "According to the 1979 Municipal Yearbook, 
most municipalities over 25,000 people conducted at-large 
elections of their city commissions or council members as of 
1977." 
Finally, I think that this approach is somwhat analogous 
to that of your opinion in Arlington Heights, supra. See 429 
u.s.' at 266-268: "The historical background is one 
evidentiary source, particularly if it reveals a series of 
official actions taken for invidious purposes.... Departures 
from the normal procedural sequence also might afford 
evidence •..• Substantive departures too may be relevant." 
To complete the reference to Arlington Heights, your 
opinion there also suggested another "backstop" safeguard 
against judicial interference with the decisionmaking of other 
bodies. "Proof that the decision ••• was motivated in part by 
a racially discriminatory purpose would not necessarily have 
required invalidation of the challenged decision. Such proof 
would, however, have shifted to the Village the burden of 
establishing that the same decision would have resulted even 
had the impermissible purpose not been considered." 429 u.s., 
at 27--271 n.21. 
If the Court were interested, it also would be possible to 
combine the approaches that I have cited as alt~rnativ~s. In a 
~
combined approach, the Court could (a) emphasize the question 




refer to certain "objective" factors as having a preferred 
place in the scheme of proof, possibly then (c) allowing proof 
that a decision motivated in part by discriminatory purpose 
would have been reached for independent reasons. 
An unrelated concluding word: In this case the Court of 
Appeals embraced the findings of the district court as "not 
clearly erroneous." As I understand it, the Court opinion in 
Swint--assigned but not yet circulated--will hold that this is 
the correct standard. If this Court does wish to reverse here, 
it therefore must emphasize that there is ~ for the 
decision. This simply could be that the factors relied on were 
too attenuated, as a matter of law, to support an inference of 
the fact of discriminatory intent. Cf. Warth v. Seldin 
(although injury was pleaded as a fact, causal chain was too 
attenuated as a matter of law to support the alleged conclusion 
of fact). 
.. 
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February 26, 1982 Conference 
List 3, Sheet 4 
No. 80-2100 
R(x;ERS, et al. 
v. 













SUMMARY: Apps move to file on or before March 5, 1982 a "reply brief" in 
response to briefs filed earlier by the appees an9 four civil rights 
/" 
organizations as amici curiae. Oral arguments were heard in this case on 
Tuesday, February 23, 1982. 
CONTENTIONS: Noting that a busy trial schedule precluded filing a reply 
brief earlier, apps state that appees and amici have filed briefs totaling 
almost 200 pages and apps have been limited to 50 pages; in addition, the 
appees' brief contains a statement of facts grossly mistaking certain facts 





DISCUSSION: Under Rule 35.3 of this Court's Rules, a "reply brief will 
be received no later than one week before the date of oral argument, and only 
by leave of court thereafter." Any reply brief was therefore due on 
February 16, 1982. However, Rule 35.6 allows for filing briefs after 
9rguments are heard. In this case, it seems appropriate to receive the apps' 
brief which addresses the appees' and amici briefs which according to the apps 
raise issues in addition to those argued by the parties. 
The motion to file a brief on or before March 5, 1982 should be granted. 







February 26, 1982 Conference 
List 3, Sheet 4 
No. 80-2100 
R(X;ERS, et al. 
v. 
LOICE, et al. 
I 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDlM 
Motion of Appellants for Leave 
to File a Delayed Reply Brief 
SUMMARY AND CONTENTIONS: Appees have filed a response to the apps' 
motion to file a reply brief;l they argue that: (1) The apps have asserted 
no grounds for filing the brief. (2) Being in trial for two months is 
insufficient reason for not filing a reply brief earlier. (3) It is the apps' 
brief, not the appees', which contains distorted material. (4) Appees were 
earlier denied permission to file a brief in excess of 50 pages; fairness 
requires that apps' motion be denied. (5) Apps' motion is not timely. 
lThe motion was addressed in a Legal Office memo on February 24, 1982. 






DISCUSSION: As noted in the original Legal Office memo, the Rules of 
this Court permit late Reply Briefs (by leave of the Court) and also briefs 
following oral argument. However denominated in this instance, it remains 




\ . ' 
·' 
Court ................... . 
Argued .................. . , 19 .. . 
l-•oted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
80-2100 
No. 




Motion of appellants for leave to file a delayed reply brief. 
HOLD 
FOR 
Burger, Ch. J ................ . 
Brennan, J ................... . 
White, J ..................... . 
Marshall, J .................. . 
Blackmun, J ................. . 
Powell, J .................... . 
Rehnquist, J ................. . 
CERT. 
G D 
Stevens, J ........................... . 




AD SENT NOT VOTING 
N POST DIS AFF REV AFF G D . ,.,.. 
' ;,)' '''''''''''''''''''''''' 
~.::;:::: :::::::: ::::::: 
v' 
• •• 0 0 0 0 •••••• 0 0 0 •••••••• 0 ••• 
V. ........................ . v 
• 0 0 ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
·;;········· 
~ :z 
--=Ro~g~e~rs~v~~L~od~g~e_J/~(~C~P~0L_ _______ co_n_f _. __ 2_/2_6_/8_2 __ No._______ -n 80-2100 
The Chief Justice /~ 




~ ~ c{), 
Justice Brennan d.U ~. 
13 /?41 ~~ t.-1 $ ~~-~ ttdb..-~  
~k.-J- '-"C.-~~/ c:,l ~ ~~-G ~ ~
~· 
Justice White~ ~ 
a-,..~~ ~ ~~-- .(>.~ q.. ~ /1 s-~ 
~ . 1.3 4-:t- 19 ·~ 4/ 
· ~~Wft1· 
tv~ ~ ~~,e tl'1.v tC 9- s ~A-!. . 
~.-'a J, 'e: . === 
Justice Marshall 
Justice Blackmun ~ 
~ d~~ ~ ~ o/ 1uv!-. ' 
2-;'~e..L- ~ ~AW. 
·' 
Justice O'Connor df/~ ( ~~~) 
J!J.c. ~ ~~~. 7.Lc.. ~i.-c., 
H-4.-~ .... ~-y . CZ.A ~ -----~..v~ ,..1.,..._..___ 
~ ,..,.44c..~ 
J ystice Blackmun 





From: Justice White 
2 ca APR 1982 
Circulated: _______ __ _ 
'f'/ ~ ~ Recirculated: 
1st PRINTED DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81}-2100 
QUENTIN ROGERS, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. 
HERMAN LODGE ET AL. 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[April -, 1982] 
JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue in this case is whether the at-large system of 
elections in Burke County, Georgia violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment rights of Burke County's black citizens. 
I 
Burke County is a large, predominately rural county lo-
cated in eastern Georgia. Eight hundred and thirty-one 
square miles in area, 1 it is approximately two-thirds the size 
of the State of Rhode Island. According to the 1980 Census, 
Burke County had a total population of 19,349, of whom 
10,385, or 53.6%, were black. 2 The average age of blacks 
living there is lower than the average age of whites and 
therefore whites constitute a slight majority of the voting age 
population. As of 1978, 6,373 persons were registered to 
' United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
County and City Data Book 1977, p. 90. 
' United States Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census 
of Population and Housing, PHC8{}-V-12. March 1981, p. 5. In 1930, 
Burke County had a total population of 29,224, of whom 12,698 or 78 per-
cent were black. United States Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Cen-
sus, II Characteristics of the Population, Pt. 2, p. 229 (1943). The per-
centage of blacks in the total population of Burke County has steadily 
diminished over the last 50 years. 
\ 
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vote in Burke County, of whom 38% were black. 3 
The Burke County Board of Commissioners governs the 
county. It was created in 1911, see Georgia Laws 1911 at 
310--311, and consists of 5 members elected at large to con-
current 4-year terms by all qualified voters in the county. 
The county has never been divided into districts, either for 
the purpose of imposing a residency requirement on candi-
dates or for the purpose of requiring candidates to be elected 
by voters residing in a district. In order to be nominated or 
elected, a candidate must receive a majority of the votes cast 
in the primary or general election, and a runoff must be held 
if no candidate receives a majority in the first primary or gen-
eral election. Ga. Code § 34-1513 (1980). Each candidate 
must run for a specific seat on the Board, Ga. Code 
§ 34-1015 (1980), and a voter may vote only once for any can-
didate. No Negro has ever been elected to the Burke 
County Board of Commissioners. 
Eight black citizens of Burke County filed this suit in 1976 
in the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Georgia. The suit was brought on behalf of all black citi-
zens in Burke County. The class was certified in 1977. The 
complaint alleged that the County's system of at-large elec-
tions violated appellees' First, Thirteenth, Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendment rights, as well as their rights under 42 
U. S. C. § § 1971, 1973, and 1983 by diluting the voting power 
of black citizens. Following a bench trial at which both sides 
introduced extensive evidence, the court issued an order on 
September 28, 1978 stating that appellees were entitled to 
prevail and ordering that Burke County be divided into 5 dis-
tricts for purposes of electing County Commissioners. App. 
to Juris. Statement 62a. The court later issued detailed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in which it stated that 
while the present method of electing County Commissioners 
was "racially neutral when adopted, [it] is being maintained 




for invidious purposes" in violation of appellees' Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendment rights. I d., at 71a, 96a. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed sub nom. Lodge v. Buxton, 
639 F. 2d 1358 (CA5 1981). It stated that while the proceed-
ings in the District Court took place prior to the decision in 
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980), the District Court cor-
rectly anticipated Mobile and required appellees to prove 
that the at-large voting system was maintained for a dis-
criminatory purpose. 639 F. 2d, at 1375-1376. The Court 
of Appeals also held that the District Court's findings not 
only were not clearly erroneous, but its conclusion that the 
at-large system was maintained for invidious purposes was 
"virtually mandated by the overwhelming proof." I d., at 
1380. We noted probable jurisdiction, -- U. S. --
(1981), and now affirm. 4 
II 
At-large voting schemes and multimember districts tend to 
minimize the voting strength of minority groups by permit-
ting the political majority to elect all representatives of the 
district. A distinct minority, whether it be a racial, ethnic, 
economic, or political group, may be unable to elect any rep-
resentatives in an at-large election, yet may be able to elect 
several representatives if the political unit is divided into sin-
gle-member districts. The minority's voting power in a 
multimember district is particularly diluted when bloc voting 
occurs and ballots are cast along strict majority-minority 
lines. While multimember districts have been challenged for 
"their winner-take-all aspects, their tendency to submerge 
minorities and to overrepresent the winning party," Whit-
comb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 158-159 (1971), this Court has 
repeatedly held that they are not unconstitutional per se. 
' The District Court's judgment was stayed pending appeal to the Court 
of Appeals. 439 U. S. 948 (1978). The Court of Appeals stayed its man-
date on April 6, 1981, pending disposition of the case here. 
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Mobile v. Bolden,...supra, at 66; White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 
755, 765 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 142. The 
Court has recognized, however, that multimember districts 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment if "conceived or operated 
as purposeful devices to further ... racial discrimination" by 
minimizing, cancelling out or diluting the voting strength of 
racial elements in the voting population. Whitcomb v. 
Chavis, supra at 149; White v. Regester, supra, at 765. 
Cases charging that multimember districts unconstitutionally 
dilute the voting strength of racial minorities are thus subject 
to the standard of proof generally applicable to Equal Protec-
tion Clause cases. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 
(1976), and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977), made it 
clear that in order for the Equal Protection Clause to be vio-
lated, "the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially 
discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially dis-
criminatory purpose." Washington v. Davis, supra, at 240. 
Neither case involved voting dilution, but the Court observed 
that the requirement that racially discriminatory purpose or 
intent be proven applies to voting cases by relying upon, 
among others, Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964), a 
districting case, to illustrate that a showing of discriminatory 
intent has long been required in all types of cases arising 
under the Equal Protection Clause. Arlington Heights, 
supra, at 265; Washington v. Davis, supra, at 240. 
Arlington Heights and Washington v. Davis both rejected 
the notion that a law is invalid under the Equal Protection 
Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of 
one race than another. Arlington Heights, supra, at 265; 
Washington v. Davis, supra, at 242. However, both cases 
recognized that discriminatory intent need not be proven by 
direct evidence. "Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory 
purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the rele-
vant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears 
more heavily on one race than another." Ibid. Thus deter-
80-210~0PINION 
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mining the existence of a discriminatory purpose "demands a 
sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence 
of intent as may be available." Arlington Heights, supra, at 
266. 
In Mobile v. Bolden, supra, the Court was called upon to 
apply these principles to the at-large election system in Mo-
bile, Alabama. Mobile is governed by three commissioners 
who exercise all legislative, executive, and administrative 
power in the municipality. 446 U. S., at 59. Each candi-
date for the City Commission runs for one of three numbered 
posts in an at-large election and can only be elected by a ma-
jority vote. Ibid. Plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf 
of all Negro citizens of Mobile alleging that the at-large 
scheme diluted their voting strength in violation of several 
statutory and constitutional provisions. The District Court 
concluded that the at-large system "violates the constitu-
tional rights of the plaintiffs by improperly restricting their 
access to the political process," 423 F. Supp. 384, 399 (SD 
Ala. 1976), and ordered that the commission form of govern-
ment be replaced by a mayor and a nine-member City Council 
elected from single-member districts. !d., at 404. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed. 571 F. 2d 238 (CA5 1978). This 
Court reversed. 
Justice Stewart, writing for himself and three other Jus-
tices, noted that to prevail in their contention that the at-
large voting system violates the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs had to prove the sys-
tem was "conceived or operated as [a] purposeful devic[e] to 
further racial . . . discrimination." 446 U. S., at 66, quoting 
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S., at 149. 5 Such a require-
• With respect to the Fifteenth Amendment, the plurality held that the 
Amendment prohibits only direct, purposefully discriminatory interference 
with the freedom of Negroes to vote. "Having found that Negroes in Mo-
bile 'register and vote without hindrance,' the District Court and Court of 
Appeals were in error in believing that the appellants invaded the protec-
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ment "is simply one aspect of the basic principle that only if 
there is purposeful discrimination can there be a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
446 U. S., at 66, and White v. Regester is consistent with that 
principle. Id., at 69. Another Justice agreed with the 
standard of proof recognized by the plurality. Id., at 101 
(WHITE, J., dissenting). 
The plurality went on to conclude that the District Court 
had failed to comply with this standard. The District Court 
had analyzed plaintiffs' claims in light of the standard which 
had been set forth in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F. 2d 1297 
(CA5 1973), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. East Carroll 
Parrish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U. S. 636 (1975) (per 
curiam). 6 Zimmer set out a list of factors 7 gleaned from 
Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, and White v. Regester, supra, 
tion of [the Fifteenth] Amendment in the present case." Mobile v. 
Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 65 (1980). Three Justices disagreed with the plurali-
ty's basis for putting aside the Fifteenth Amendment. Id., at 84 n. 3 
(STEVENS, J., concurring); Id., at 102 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Id., at 
12&-135 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). We express no view on the applica-
tion of the Fifteenth Amendment to this case. 
The plurality noted that plaintiffs' claim under § 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act, 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973, added nothing to their 
Fifteenth Amendment claim because the "legislative history of § 2 makes 
clear that it was intended to have an effect no different from that of the 
Fifteenth Amendment itself." I d., at 60-61. 
6 We specifically affirmed the judgment below "without approval of the 
constitutional views expressed by the Court of Appeals." 424 U. S., at 
638. 
' The primary factors listed in Zimmer include a lack of minority access 
to the candidate selection process, unresponsiveness of elected officials to 
minority interests, a tenuous state policy underlying the preference for 
multi-member or at-large districting, and the existence of past discrimina-
tion which precludes effective participation in the elector process. 485 
F. 2d, at 1305. Factors which enhance the proof of voting dilution are the 
existence of large districts, anti-single shot voting provisions, and the ab-




that a court should consider in assessing the constitutionality 
of at-large and multimember district voting schemes. 
Under Zimmer, voting dilution is established "upon proof of 
the existence of an aggregate of these factors." 485 F. 2d, at 
1305. 
The plurality in Mobile was of the view that Zimmer was 
"decided upon the misunderstanding that it is not necessary 
to show a discriminatory purpose in order to prove a violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause-that proof of a discrimina-
tory effect is sufficient." 446 U. S., at 71. The plurality ob-
served that while "the presence of the indicia relied on in 
Zimmer may afford some evidence of a discriminatory pur-
pose," the mere existence of those criteria is not a substitute 
for a finding of discriminatory purpose. I d., at 73. The 
District Court's standard in Mobile was likewise flawed. Fi-
nally, the plurality concluded that the evidence upon which 
the lower courts had relied was "insufficient to prove an un-
constitutionally discriminatory purpose in the present case." 
Ibid. JUSTICE STEVENS rejected the intentional discrimina-
tion standard but concluded that the proof failed to satisfy 
the legal standard that in his view was the applicable rule. 
He therefore concurred in the judgment of reversal. Four 
other Justices, however, thought the evidence sufficient to 
satisfy the purposeful discrimination standard. One of 
them, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, nevertheless concurred in the 
Court's judgment because he believed an erroneous remedy 
had been imposed. 
Because the District Court in the present case employed 
the evidentiary factors outlined in Zimmer, it is urged that 
its judgment is infirm for the same reasons that led to the re-
versal in Mobile. We do not agree. First, and funda-
mentally, we are unconvinced that the District Court in this 
case applied the wrong legal standard. Not only was the 
District Court's decision rendered a considerable time after 
Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights, but the trial 




(CA5 1978), where the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
assessed the impact of Washington v. Davis and Arlington 
Heights and concluded that "a showing of racially motivated 
discrimination is a necessary element in an equal protection 
voting dilution claim ... " 571 F. 2d, at 219. The court 
stated that "[t]he ultimate issue in a case alleging unconstitu-
tional dilution of votes of a racial group is whether the dis-
tricting plan under attack exists because it was intended to 
diminish or dilute the political efficacy of that group." I d., 
at 226. The Court of Appeals also explained that although 
the evidentiary factors outlined in Zimmer were important 
considerations in arriving at the ultimate conclusion of dis-
criminatory intent, the plaintiff is not limited to those fac-
tors. "The task before the fact finder is to determine, under 
all the relevant facts, in whose favor the 'aggregate' of the 
evidence preponderates. This determination is peculiarly 
dependent upon the facts of each case." I d., at 224. 
The District Court referred to N evett v. Sides and demon-
strated its understanding of the controlling standard by ob-
serving that a determination of discriminatory intent is "a 
requisite to a finding of unconstitutional vote dilution" under 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. App. to Juris. 
Statement 68a. Furthermore, while recognizing that the 
evidentiary factors identified in Zimmer were to be consid-
ered, the District Court was aware that it was "not limited in 
its determination only to the Zimmer factors" but could con-
sider other relevant factors as well. I d., at 70a. The Dis-
trict Court then proceeded to deal with what it considered to 
be the relevant proof and concluded that the at-large scheme 
of electing commissioners, "although racially neutral when 
adopted, is being maintained for invidious purposes." I d., 
at 71a. That system "while neutral in origin . . . has been 
subverted to invidious purposes." !d., at 90a. For the 
most part, the District Court dealt with the evidence in 
terms of the factors set out in Zimmer and its progeny, but 
as the Court of Appeals stated: 
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"Judge Alaimo employed the constitutionally required 
standard ... [and] did not treat the Zimmer criteria as 
absolute, but rather considered them only to the extent 
they were relevant to the question of discriminatory in-
tent." 639 F. 2d, at 1376. 
Although a tenable --argument can be made to the contrary, 
we are not inclined to disagree with the Court of Appeals' 




We are also unconvinced that we should disturb the Dis-
trict Court's finding that the at-large system in Burke 
County was being maintained for the invidious purpose of di-
luting the voting strength of the black population. In White 
v. Regester, 412 U. S., at 769-770, we stated that we were 
not inclined to overturn the District Court's factual findings, 
"representing as they do a blend of history and an intensely 
local appraisal of the design and impact of the Bexar County 
multimember district in the light of past and present reality, 
political and otherwise." See also Columbus Board of Edu-
cation v. Penrick, 443 U. S. 449, 468 (1979) (CHIEF JUSTICE 
BURGER, concurring). Our recent decision in Pullman-
Standard v. Swint, -- U. S. -- (1982), emphasizes the 
deference Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52 requires reviewing courts 
to give a trial court's findings of fact. "Rule 52 broadly re-
quires that findings of fact not be set aside unless clearly er-
roneous. It does not make exceptions or purport to exclude 
certain categories of factual findings .... " Op. at 13. The 
Court held that the issue of whether the differential impact of 
a seniority system resulted from an intent to discriminate on 
racial grounds "is a pure question of fact, subject to Rule 52's 
clearly erroneous standard." Op. at 14. The Swint Court 
also noted that issues of intent are commonly treated as fac-
80--2100---0 PINION 
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tual matters. Id., at 14-15. We are of the view that the 
same clearly-erroneous standard applies to the trial court's 
finding in this case that the at-large system in Burke County 
is ·being maintained for discriminatory purposes, as well as to 
the court's subsidiary findings of fact. The Court of Appeals 
did not hold any of the District Court's findings of fact to be 
clearly erroneous, and this Court has frequently noted its re-
luctance to disturb findings of fact concurred in by two lower 
courts. See, e. g., Berenyi v. Information Director, 385 
U. S. 630, 635 (1967); Blau v. Lehman, 368 U. S. 403, 
408-409 (1962); Graver Mfg. Co. v. Linde Co., 336 U. S. 271, 
275 (1949). We agree with the Court of Appeals that on the 
record before us, none of the factual findings are clearly 
erroneous. 
B 
The District Court found that blacks have always made up 
a substantial majority of the population in Burke County, 
App. to Juris. Statement 66a n. 3, but that they are a distinct 
minority of the registered voters. I d., at 71a-72a. There 
was also overwhelming evidence of bloc voting along racial 
lines. Id., at 72a-73a. Hence, although there had been 
black candidates, no black had ever been elected to the Burke 
County commission. These facts bear heavily on the issue of 
purposeful discrimination. Voting along racial lines allows 
those elected to ignore black interests without fear of politi-
cal consequences, and without bloc voting the minority candi-
dates would not lose elections solely because of their race. 
Because it is sensible to expect that at least some blacks 
would have been elected in Burke County, the fact that none 
have ever been elected is important evidence of purposeful 
exclusion. See White v. Regester, supra, at 766. 
Under our cases, however, such facts are insufficient in 
themselves to prove purposeful discrimination absent other 
evidence such as proof that blacks have less opportunity to 
participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of 
80-2100-0PINION 
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their choice. United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 
U. S. 144, 167 (1977); White v. Regester, supra, at 76~766; 
Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 149; see also Mobile v. 
Bolden, supra, at 66 (plurality opinion). Both the District 
Court and the Court of Appeals thought the supporting proof 
in this case was sufficient to support an inference of inten-
tional discrimination. The supporting evidence was orga-
nized primarily around the factors which Nevett v. Sides, 
supra, had deemed relevant to the issue of intentional 
discrimination. These factors were primarily those sug-
gested in Zimmer v. McKeithen, supra. 
The District Court began by determining the impact of 
past discrimination on the ability of blacks to participate ef-
fectively in the political process. Past discrimination was 
found to contribute to low black voter registration because 
prior to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, blacks had been de-
nied access by means such as literacy tests, poll taxes, and 
white primaries. The result was that "Black suffrage in 
Burke County was virtually non-existent." App. to Juris. 
Statement 71a. Black voter registration in Burke County 
has increased following the Voting Rights Act to the point 
that some 38 per cent of blacks eligible to vote are registered 
to do so. I d., at 72a. On that basis the District Court in-
ferred that "past discrimination has had an adverse effect on 
black voter registration which lingers to this date." Ibid. 
Past discrimination against blacks in education also had the 
same effect. Not only did Burke County schools discrimi-
nate against blacks as recently as 1969, but some schools still 
remain essentially segregated and blacks as a group have 
completed less formal education than whites. I d., at 7 4a. 
The District Court found further evidence of exclusion 
from the political process. Past discrimination had pre-
vented blacks from effectively participating in Democratic 
Party affairs and in primary elections. Until this law suit 
was filed, there had never been a black member of the 
County Executive Committee of the Democratic Party. 
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There were also property ownership requirements that made 
it difficult for blacks to serve as chief registrar in the county. 
There had also been discrimination in the selection of grand 
jurors, the hiring of county employees, and in the appoint-
ments to boards and committees which oversee the county 
government. Id., at 74-76a. The District Court thus con-
cluded that historical discrimination had restricted the 
present opportunity of blacks effectively to participate in the 
political process. Evidence of historical discrimination is rel-
evant to drawing an inference of purposeful discrimination, 
particularly in cases such as this one where the evidence 
shows that discriminatory practices were commonly utilized, 
that they were abandoned when enjoined by courts or made 
illegal by civil rights legislation, and that they were replaced 
by laws and practices which, though neutral on their face, 
serve to maintain the status quo. 
Extensive evidence was cited by the District Court to sup-
port its finding that elected officials of Burke County have 
been unresponsive and insensitive to the needs of the black 
community,8 which increases the likelihood that the political 
process was not equally open to blacks. This evidence 
ranged from the effects of past discrimination which still 
haunt the county courthouse to the infrequent appointment of 
blacks to county boards and committees; the overtly discrimi-
natory pattern of paving county roads; the reluctance of the 
county to remedy black complaints, which forced blacks to 
take legal action to obtain school and grand jury desegrega-
tion; and the role played by the County Commissioners in the 
incorporation of an all-white private school to which they do-
8 The Court of Appeals held that "proof of unresponsiveness by the pub-
lic body in question to the group claiming injury" is an essential element of 
a claim of voting dilution under the Fourteenth Amendment. 639 F . 2d, at 
1375. Under our cases, however, unresponsiveness is an important ele-
ment but only one of a number of circumstances a court should consider in 
determining whether discriminatory purpose may be inferred. 
8(}-2100-0PINION 
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nated public funds for the purchase of band uniforms. I d., at 
77a-82a. 
The District Court also considered the depressed socio-eco-
nomic status of Burke County blacks. It found that propor-
tionately more blacks than whites have incomes below the 
poverty level. I d., at 83a. Nearly 53 per cent of all black 
families living in Burke County had incomes equal to or less 
than three-fourths of a poverty-level income. Ibid. Not 
only have blacks completed less formal education than 
whites, but the education they have received "was qualita-
tively inferior to a marked degree." I d., at 84a. Blacks 
tend to receive less pay than whites, even for similar work, 
and they tend to be employed in menial jobs more often than 
whites. I d., at 85a. Seventy-three per cent of houses occu-
pied by blacks lacked all or some plumbing facilities; only 16 
per cent of white-occupied houses suffered the same de-
ficiency. Ibid. The District Court concluded that the de-
pressed socio-economic status of blacks results in part from 
"the lingering effects of past discrimination." Ibid. 
Although finding that the state policy behind the at-large 
electoral system in Burke County was "neutral in origin," the 
District Court concluded that the policy "has been subverted 
for invidious purposes." Id., at 90a. As a practical matter, 
maintenance of the state statute providing for at-large elec-
tions in Burke County is determined by Burke County's state 
representatives, for the legislature defers to their wishes on 
matters of purely local application. The court found that 
Burke County's state representatives "have retained a sys-
tem which has minimized the ability of Burke County blacks 
to participate in the political system." Ibid. 
The trial court considered, in addition, several factors 
which this Court has indicated enhance the tendency of 
multimember districts to minimize the voting strength of ra-
cial minorities. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S., at 
143--144. It found that the sheer geographic size of the 
county, which is nearly two-thirds the size of Rhode Island, 
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"has made it more difficult for Blacks to get to polling places 
or to campaign for office." I d., at 91a. The court con-
cluded, as a matter oflaw, that the size of the county tends to 
impair the access of blacks to the political process. I d., at 
92a. The majority vote requirement, Ga. Code § 34-1513 
(1980), was found "to submerge the will of the minority" and 
thus "deny the minority's access to the system." I d., at 92a. 
The court also found the requirement that candidates run for 
specific seats, Ga. Code § 34-1015 (1980), enhances respond-
ent's lack of access because it prevents a cohesive political 
group from concentrating on a single candidate. Because 
Burke County has no residency requirement, "[a]ll candi-
dates could reside in Waynesboro, or in lilly-white neighbor-
hoods. To that extent, the denial of access becomes en-
hanced." I d., at 93a. 
None of the District Court's findings underlying its ulti-
mate finding of intentional discrimination appears to us to be 
clearly erroneous; and as we have said, we decline to over-
turn the essential finding of the District Court, agreed to by 
the Court of Appeals, that the at-large system in Burke 
County has been maintained for the purpose of denying 
blacks equal access to the political processes in the county. 
As in White v. Regester, 412 U. S., at 767, the District 
Court's findings were "sufficient to sustain [its] judgment 
... and, on this record, we have no reason to disturb them." 
IV 
We also find no reason to overturn the relief ordered by the 
District Court. Neither the District Court nor the Court of 
Appeals discerned any special circumstances that would mili-
tate against /utilizing single-member districts. Where "a 
constitutional violation has been found, the remedy does not 
'exceed' the violation if the remedy is tailored to cure the 
'condition that offends the Constitution.'" Milliken v. Brad-
80-2100-0PINION 
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ley, 433 U. S. 267, 282 (1977), quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 
418 u. s. 717, 738 (1974). 9 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
• Appellants contend that the District Court should not have divided 
Burke County into 5 districts but should have allowed appellants to devise 
a plan for subdividing the County and to submit their plan for preclearance 
under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 79 Stat. 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1973c. This contention was not raised in the Court of Appeals and was 
not addressed by that court. We therefore do not address it. See 
Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 147 n. 2 (1970). 
Appellants also contend that the doctrine of unconstitutional dilution of 
voting rights arising from an at-large election system does not apply to 
county governing bodies. We find no merit to this contention, having pre-
viously affirmed a judgment that at-large elections for the governing body 
of a parish (county) unconstitutionally diluted black voting strength. East 
Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U. S. 636 (1976). 
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5 
Justice Powell, dissenting. 
I 
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980}, establishes 
that an at-large voting system must be upheld against 
constitutional attack unless maintained for a 10 
discriminatory purpose. In Mobile we reversed a finding 
of unconstitutional vote dilution because the lower courts 
had relied on factors insufficient as a matter of law to 
establish discriminatory intent. See 446 u.s., at 73 
(plurality opinion of Stewart, J.}. The lower courts in 15 
~. 
this case based their finding of unconsitutional 
discrimination on the same factors held insufficient in 
Mobile. Yet the Court now finds the conclusion 
unexceptionable. The Mobile plurality also affirmed that 
the concept of "intent" was no mere fiction, and held that 20 
the District Court had erred in "its failure to identify 
the state officials whose intent it considered relevant." 
Although the lower courts did not answer that question in 
this case, the Court today affirms their decision. 
Whatever the wisdom of Mobile, the Court's opinion 25 
cannot be reconciled persuasively with that case. 
~ ~ ~ a...J- SoMf-
/ -All~iins fe 'X, variances in the largely sociological 
g~t 
evidence presented in the two cases ,~ Mobile held that this 
kind of evidence was not enough. Such evidence, we found 
in Mobile, did not merely fall short, but "fell far 30 
"' ,..... . ,-........ 
3. 
~ 




short [,] of showing that [an at-large electoral scheme 
was] 'conceived or operated [as a] purposeful devic [e] to 
1-,?lSI.S ) 
(. ~ t¥1 p "- oJ.. d ~ q{ 
further racial ... discrimination.'" Id., at 7 r quoting 
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 u.s., at 149. Because I still :;} 
~u....:.._~ .. ) 
believe that Mobile was eerree&ly deci~, I dissent. 
1\ 
II 
The Court's decision today relies heavily on the 
capacity of the federal district courts--essentially free 
from any standards propounded by this Court--to determine 
whether at-large voting systems are "being maintained for 
the invidious purpose of diluting the voting strength of 
the black population." Ante, at 
we ~should view f.in~in=~rirninato ~ 7 




of history and intensely local appraisal of the design 
and impact of [a] multimember district in the light of 
past and present reality, political and otherwise." 
Ibid., at 9, quoting White v. Regester, 412 u.s., at 769-
t~tLJ 
~ ""CaQ.e._as . .in Meeile..,. Justice STEVENS argues ~c..e/."fll)l 
_ t...l ~ ll J II 
~~ Cov.ri-'.1 ~~ ~ &.tloj ,~..,....OJ~ (' ~ 
approach is seriously flawed. ""'!\1 thoag;lwo I agree 
t«- 't h o ~~ IH" r 1 
s~f>(ll. ,... "') 
with much of what he says • I wr i tel to note my areas of 
divergence from his insightful analysis. 
A 55 
dcA.~-ub; ~ .. v-1- wz..U.. As I understand it, Justice STEVENS's a-t.tay - t e 
I 
Court's approach can · be seen as resting on three 
principles with which I am in fundamental agreement. 
First, it is appropriate to distinguish between 
"state action that inhibits an individual's right to vote 60 
::>. 
c. 
and state action that aff~ts the political strength of 
f101o,/~ v. (1o(d~ ..... ' ~s, 
various groups." 446 u.s., ~ 83. Under this 
distinction, this case is fundamentally different from 
cases involving direct barriers to voting. There is no 
claim here that blacks may not register freely and vote 65 
for whom they choose. This case also differs from one-
man, one-vote cases, in which districting practices make a 
person's vote less weighty in some districts than in 
others. 
Second, I agree with Justice STEVENS that vote 70 
(" 
dilution cases of this kind are analytically 
--f!c.O~Ctr>-lf'l i-. \4 ~ f(.....,,..J•~~c~ s~-t QO'S+) ~t ~& 11 .... , o.~rL ll -
indistinguishable from other ~errymanders. "By definition 
f\C. \ • o ... .5 ),:, i rcl fi'H () ,p 0 
gerrymandering involves drawing district boundaries "tor o-
\f' . 
W ,!J; trs'ht<r l!lu""lhmemb"r -di"Striet: ArJ' -.rt- l arg" elections~ in 




"' "' ::J • (' ~\ \ '(' """II- . '4"~ 
'-- t 1 \.... \ c't • ( 
f'\0\o/ ~t_,_Q.. ' l ~,· ../' .. ..,.. 




political faction and to minimize the 
If~ t ~..._,.4f-t' · / -,1 c /VS 
strength of those opposed to it." ~at 87{_ ~Tt / 
j, I C. o "' ~ .. r, ·~) 
Finally, Justice STEVENS is correct that the standard 
used to idefltify unlawful racial discrimination in this 
area must 
! 




that are judicially 
(Jo~J-J o..+- !G.-1?. 
manageable and app~o~ri&ee. The federal judiciary should 
not undertake to restructure state political systems in 
\ 
the absence of compelling reasons of both law and fact. 
\. ~~--~~-- ..... \ ~ 




political area, where the identification of a seeming 85 
violation in suggests an enforceable judicial 
a- ~~1) Fti4:... 67L. 
remedy--or at least one shor~of quotas ~ ~ eyeb&m~of 
;a'J~~"?·•fo;t'SJ 6 /'JH.I ---~~ ~~, ·~~) group representation. ~ r - F -, 
~~ ~~hl.L~ ,t., ~ 
~ -~~-
Justice STEVENS would accommodate these principles by 90 
:r 'f 
J' 
holding that intent~irrelevant to the establishment 
of a case of racial vote dilution under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
,/ purpose of the Equal PfV'ection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is the prevention of official conduct 95 
discriminating on the basis of race." Washington v. 
y ;2C, tA•~. 2~ "'; (.1~ ?6/~ 
Davis,~~ 242. Because I am unwilling to abandon this 
central principle in cases of this kind, I cannot join 
Justice STEVENS's opinion. 
~ 
Nonetheless, I do agree with t1Ystiee S'fBVBNS that 100 
~ ;~...._ rP"T.~~ 
what he calls "objective" factors should of 
$ .h&ss~~~ 
inquiry in ~ vote-dilution cas;: Unlike th~s~on 
which the lowers courts relied in this case and in Mobile, 
c:~.~ ''o\Ql(' t+"...»e '' / I'"~ 
the factors identified by Justice STEVENS~ are~direct, 
~·~ 
and uftatte~ated indices of discriminatory 105 
Q • 
) 
--- ' ~ 
¥""-\" ~ ~ bJ .cJ4l ~<; 
n '-~ ~ · ....- · r.tfA,) 1 .... rt 
\) f II"\ +•""' t;) -t 
intent. MO<ee¥~ primary reliance on these factor~uld d•~~ 
"",...,...t. . 
help to avoid federal inquiries into the subjective 
--
thought processes of local officialsA_ at least until 
-f.g C..'f'P"-.J..&. 
evidence had been presented fr~M •minb a 
,U0:~ /' , ~~~D~)~) 
V(.l 110 . 
In the absence of proof of discrimination by rel}ance 
on the kind of objective factors identified by Justice 
STEVENS, I would hold that the factors cited by the Court 
.-"' 
of Appeals were too attenuated as a matter of law to 
support an inference of discriminatory intent. I would 115 
reverse its judgment on that basis. 
lfp/ss 06/22/82 Rider A, p. 3 (Rogers) 
ROGERS3 SALLY-POW 
This determination decides the case. It is a conclusion 
of law; not a finding of fact. As was true in Mobile, the 
opinions of the courts below have made few findings of 
fact based on identificable objective evidence. In 
elevating ultimate conclusion of law to the status of 
controlling factual findings, entitled to the most 
substantial deference by appellate courts, this Court 
relies on White v. Regester, 412 u.s., at 769-770. That 
was a very different case, as was made clear by Mobile. 
Note to Dick: Do you think the foregoing is 
fair? Also, please check to see whether I am correct in 
thinking that Mobile distinguished White v. Regester. 
~. 
Certainly it did not follow it. I must say, however, that 
there is language in Regester that is not easy to 
reconcile. 
We had a Title VII case this Term {Was in 
Swint?) from CAS in which we rejected that Circuit's 
distinction between facts and "ultimate facts". Is there 
anything in that opinion that is relevant to this case? 
Perhaps not, but take a look. 
I like your draft, and suggest that we put it in 
line with the print shop even though JPS has not 
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No. 80-2100, Rogers v. Lodge 
Justice Powell, dissenting. 
I 
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 u.s. 55 (1980), establishes 
that an at-large voting system must be upheld against 
constitutional attack unless maintained for a 
discriminatory purpose. In Mobile we reversed a finding 
of unconstitutional vote dilution because the lower courts 
had relied on factors insufficient as a matter of law to 
establish discriminatory intent. See 4~W-~ ~ 
(plura:p ty _2g~i..2~<:n-"~~f s .tewart, J.) • The lower eotlrt~ il'l ;J--
f/,A~#"f~/ ~ s /\ 
1 this case based their finding of unconsitutional ~ / A 
discrimination on the same factors held insufficient in 
Mobile. Yet the Court now finds their conclusion 
unexceptionable. The Mobile plurality also affirmed that 
the concept of "intent" was no mere fiction, and held that 
the District Court had erred in "its failure to identify 
the state officials whose intent it considered relevant." 
~ 
Id., at 74 n. 20. Although the ~~ courts Adid not 
answer that question in this case, the Court today affirms 
their decision. 
Whatever the wisdom of Mobile, the Court's opinion 
cannot be reconciled persuasively with that case. There 
are some variances in the largely sociological evidence 
presented in the two cases. But Mobile held that this 
kind of evidence was not enough. Such evidence, we found 
in Mobile, did not merely fall short, but "fell far 
short [,] of showing that [an at-large electoral scheme 
was] 'conceived or operated [as a] purposeful devic [e] to 
further racial .•. discrimination.'" Id., at 70 (emphasis 
added), quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 u.s. 124, 149 
(1971). Because I believe that Mobile controls this case, 
I dissent. 
II 
The Court's decision today relies heavily on the 
capacity of the federal district courts--essentially free 
from any standards propounded by this Court--to determine 
whether at-large voting systems are "being maintained for 
Jo 
the invidious purpose of diluting the voting strength of 
the black population." Ante, at 9. Federal courts thus 
are invited to engage in deeply subjective inquiries into 
the motivations of local officials in structuring local 
governments. Inquiries of this kind not only can be 
"unseemly," see Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered 
Inquiry, 15 San Diego Law Rev. 1163, 1164 (1978): they 
intrude the federal courts--with only the vaguest 
constitutional direction--into an area of intensely local 
and political concern. 
Emphasizing these considerations, Justice STEVENS, 
post, at ___ , argues forcefully that the Court's focus of 
inquiry is seriously mistaken. I agree with much of what 
he says. As I do not share his views entirely, however, 
I write separately. 
A 
As I understand it, Justice STEVENS's critique of the 
Court's approach rests on three principles with which I am 
in fundamental agreement. 
First, it is appropriate to distinguish between 
"state action that inhibits an individual's right to vote 
and state action that affects the political strength of 
various groups." Mobile v. Bolden, 446 u.s. 55, 83 
4. 
(STEVENS, J., concurring)~ see post, at Under this 
distinction, this case is fundamentally different from 
cases involving direct barriers to voting. There is no 
claim here that blacks may not register freely and vote 
for whom they choose. This case also differs from one-
man, one-vote cases, in which districting practices make a 
person's vote less weighty in some districts than in 
others. 
Second, I agree with Justice STEVENS that vote 
dilution cases of this kind are difficult if not 
impossible to distinguish--especially in their remedial 
aspect--from other actions to redress gerrymanders. See 
post, at __ . f:J 
Finally, ~Justice 
r~~~ 
STEVENSAis correc~at the 
standard used to identify unlawful racial discrimination 
in this area~ defined in terms that are judicially 
" manageable and reviewable. See post, at In the 
absence of compelling reasons of both law and fact, the 
federal judiciary is ~y unwarranted in undertaking to 
restructure state political systems. This is inherently a 
political area, where the identification of a seeming 
.. ~~~ f bl 'd' '1 v1olat1on 1..n -UO- ~ia:/ 
1 
sugg~ an en orcea e JU 1c1a 
remedy--or at least none short of a system of quotas or 
50 
group representation. Any such system
1
of cours) would be 
antithetical to the principles of our democracy. 
B 
Justice STEVENS would accommodate these principles by 
holding that subjective intent is irrelevant to the 
establishment of a case of racial vote dilution under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See post, at Despite sharing 
the concerns from which his position is developed, I would 
not accept this view. "The central purpose of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the 
prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis 
of race." Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). 
Because I am unwilling to abandon this central principle 
in cases of this kind, I cannot join Justice STEVENS's 
opinion. 
Nonetheless, I do agree with him that what he calls 
"objective" factors should be the focus of inquiry in 
vote-dilution cases. Unlike the considerations on which 
the lowers courts relied in this case and in Mobile, the 
factors identified by Justice STEVENS as "objective" in 
fact are direct, reliable, and unambiguous indices of 
if_ tv..(_, ~~~J ~~~/ 
discriminatory intent. Br holdiAg 1\ that the district 
courts must place primary reliance on these factors to 
establish disc~ry intent, 0·~co~C::;:;:t 
~ federal~ inquiries into the subjective thought 
processes of local officials--at least until enough 
objective evidence had been presented to warrant discovery 
~into subjective motivations in this complex, 
politically charged area. By prescribing such a rule we 
would hold federal courts to a standard that was 
judicially manageable. And we would remain faithful to 
the central protective purpose of the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
In the absence of proof of discrimination by reliance 
on the kind of objective factors identified by Just ice 
STEVENS, I would hold that the factors cited by the Court 
of Appeals are too attenuated as a matter of law to 
support an inference of discriminatory intent. I would 
reverse its judgment on that basis. 
June 24, 1982 
First Draft 
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Justice Powell, dissenting. 
I 
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 u.s. 55 (1980), establishes 
that an at-large voting system must be upheld against 
constitutional attack unless maintained for a 
discriminatory purpose. In Mobile we rever sed a finding 
of unconstitutional vote dilution because the lower courts 
had relied on factors insufficient as a matter of law to 
establish discriminatory intent. See 446 u.s., at 73 
(plurality opinion of Stewart, J.) . The District Court 
and Court of Appeals in this case based their findings of 
unconsitutional discrimination on the same factors held 
insufficient in Mobile. Yet the Court now finds their 
conclusion unexceptionable. The Mobile plurality also 
. ' 
affirmed that the concept of "intent" was no mere fiction, 
and held that the District Court had erred in "its failure 
to identify the state officials whose intent it considered 
relevant." Id., at 74 n. 20. Although the courts below 
did not answer that question in this case, the Court today 
affirms their decision. 
Whatever the wisdom of Mobile, the Court's opinion 
cannot be reconciled persuasively with that case. There 
are some variances in the largely sociological evidence 
presented in the two cases. But Mobile held that this 
kind of evidence was not enough. Such evidence, we found 
in Mobile, did not merely fall short, but "fell far 
short [,] of showing that [an at-large electoral scheme 
was] 'conceived or operated [as a] purposeful devic [e] to 
further racial •.• discrimination.'" Id., at 70 (emphasis 
added), quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 u.s. 124, 149 
(1971). Because I believe that Mobile controls this case, 
I dissent. 
II 
The Court's decision today relies heavily on the 
capacity of the federal district courts--essentially free 
from any standards propounded by this Court--to determine 
whether at-large voting systems are "being maintained for 
the invidious purpose of diluting the voting strength of 
the black population." Ante, at 9. Federal courts thus 
are invited to engage in deeply subjective inquiries into 
the motivations of local officials in structuring local 
governments. Inquiries of this kind not only can be 
"unseemly," see Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered 
Inquiry, 15 San Diego Law Rev. 1163, 1164 (1978); they 
intrude the federal courts--with only the vaguest 
constitutional direction--into an area of intensely local 
and political concern. 
Emphasizing these considerations, Justice STEVENS, 
post, at ___ , argues forcefully that the Court's focus of 
inquiry is seriously mistaken. I agree with much of what 
he says. As I do not share his views entirely, however, 
I write separately. 
A 
As I understand it, Justice STEVENS's critique of the . 
Court's approach rests on three principles with which I am 
in fundamental agreement. 
First, it is appropriate to distinguish between 
"state action that inhibits an individual's right to vote 
and state action that affects the political strength of 
various groups." Mobile v. Bolden, 446 u.s. 55, 83 
1· .:, \ ~· 
(STEVENS, J., concurring)~ see post, at Under this 
distinction, this case is fundamentally different from 
cases involving direct barriers to voting. There is no 
claim here that blacks may not register freely and vote 
for whom they choose. This case also differs from one-
man, one-vote cases, in which districting practices make a 




agree with Justice 
of this kind are 
STEVENS that vote 
difficult if not 
impossible to distinguish--especially in their remedial 
aspect--from other actions to redress gerrymanders. See 
post, at 
Finally, Justice STEVENS clearly is correct in 
arguing that the standard used to identify unlawful racial 
discrimination in this area should be defined in terms 
that are judicially manageable and reviewable. See post, 
at In the absence of compelling reasons of both law 
and fact, the federal judiciary is unwarranted in 
undertaking to restructure state political systems. This 
is inherently a political area, where the identification 
of a seeming violation does not necessarily suggest an 
enforceable judicial remedy--or at least none short of a 
5. 
system of quotas or group representation. Any such 
system, of course, would be antithetical to the principles 
of our democracy. 
B 
Justice STEVENS would accommodate these principles by 
holding that subjective intent is irrelevant to the 
establishment of a case of racial vote dilution under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See post, at Despite sharing 
the concerns from which his position is developed, I would 
not accept this view. 
Protection Clause of 
"The central purpose of the Equal 
the Fourteenth Amendment is the 
prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis 
of race." Washington v. Davis, 426 u.s. 229, 242 (1976). 
Because I am unwilling to abandon this central principle 
in cases of this kind, I cannot join Just ice STEVENS's 
opinion. 
Nonetheless, I do agree with him that what he calls 
"objective" factors should be the focus of inquiry in 
vote-dilution cases. Unlike the considerations on which 
the lower courts relied in this case and in Mobile, the 
factors identified by Justice STEVENS as "objective" in 
fact are direct, reliable, and unambiguous indices of 
discriminatory intent. If we held, as I think we should, 
that the district courts must place primary reliance on 
these factors to establish discriminatory intent, we would 
prevent federal court inquiries into the subjective 
thought processes of local officials--at least until 
enough objective evidence had been presented to warrant 
discovery into subjective motivations in this complex, 
politic ally charged area. By prescribing such a rule we 
would hold federal courts to a standard that was 
judicially manageable. And we would remain faithful to 
the central protective purpose of the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
In the absence of proof of discrimination by reliance 
on the kind of objective factors identified by Just ice 
STEVENS, I would hold that the factors cited by the Court 
of Appeals are too attenuated as a matter of 
support an inference of discriminatory intent. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-2100 
QUENTIN ROGERS, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. 
HERMAN LODGE ET AL. 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1982] 
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 
Our legacy of racial discrimination has left its scars on 
Burke County, Georgia. 1 The record in this case amply sup-
ports the conclusion that the governing officials of Burke 
County have repeatedly denied black citizens rights guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the 
Federal Constitution. No one could legitimately question 
the validity of remedial measures, whether legislative or ju-
dicial, designed to prohibit discriminatory conduct by public 
officials and to guarantee that black citizens are effectively 
afforded the rights to register and to vote. Public roads may 
not be paved only in areas in which white citizens live; 2 black 
citizens may not be denied employment opportunities in 
county government; 3 segregated schools may not be 
maintained. 4 
' Certain vestiges of discrimination-although clearly not the most 
pressing problems facing black citizens today-are a haunting reminder of 
an all too recent period of our nation's history. The District Court found 
that a segregated laundromat is operated within a few blocks of the county 
courthouse; at the courthouse itself, faded paint over restroom doors does 
not entirely conceal the words "colored" and "white." 
2 Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 511 F. Supp. 1375 (MD Fla. 1981). 
' 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2. 
'Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483. 
------- ------ ----------- - ----
80--2100---DISSENT 
2 ROGERSv. LODGE 
Nor, in my opinion, could there be any doubt about the con-
stitutionality of an amendment to the Voting Rights Act that 
would require Burke County and other covered jurisdictions 
to abandon specific kinds of at-large voting schemes that per-
petuate the effects of past discrimination. "As against the 
reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any ratio-
nal means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial 
discrimination in voting." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 
383 U. S. 301, 324. It might indeed be wise policy to accel-
erate the transition of minority groups to a position of politi-
cal power commensurate with their voting strength by 
amending the Act to prohibit the use of multimember dis-
tricts in all covered jurisdictions. 
The Court's decision today, however, is not based on either 
its own conception of sound policy or any statutory command. 
The decision rests entirely on the Court's interpretation of 
the requirements of the Federal Constitution. Despite my 
sympathetic appraisal of the Court's laudable goals, I am un-
able to agree with its approach to the constitutional issue that 
is presented. In my opinion, this case raises questions that 
encompass more than the immediate plight of disadvantaged 
black citizens. I believe the Court errs by holding the struc-
ture of the local governmental unit unconstitutional without 
identifying an acceptable, judicially-manageable standard for 
adjudicating cases of this kind. 
I 
The Court's entry into the business of electoral reappor-
tionment in 1962 was preceded by a lengthy and scholarly de-
bate over the role the judiciary legitimately could play in 
what Justice Frankfurter described in Colegrove v. Green, 
328 U. S. 549, as a "political thicket." 5 In that case, decided 
5 In his much criticized opinion announcing the judgment of the Court, 




in 1946, the Court declined to entertain a challenge to single-
member congressional districts in Illinois that had been cre-
ated in 1901 and had become grossly unequal by reason of the 
great growth in urban population. 6 In dissent, Justice Black 
advocated the use of a state-wide, at-large election of repre-
sentatives; he argued that an at-large election "has an ele-
ment of virtue that the more convenient method does not 
have-namely, it does not discriminate against some groups 
to favor others, it gives all the people an equally effective 
voice in electing their representatives as is essential under a 
free government, and it is constitutional." /d., at 574. 
In 1962, the Court changed course. In another challenge 
"Nothing is clearer than that this controversy concerns matters that bring 
courts into immediate and active relations with party contests. From the 
determination of such issues this Court has traditionally held aloof. It is 
hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in the politics of the 
people. And it is not less pernicious if such judicial intervention in an es-
sentially political contest be dressed up in the abstract phrases of the law. 
"Courts ought not to enter this political thicket. The remedy for unfair-
ness in districting is to secure State legislatures that will apportion prop-
erly, or to invoke the ample powers of Congress. The Constitution has 
many commands that are not enforceable by courts because they clearly 
fall outside the conditions and purposes that circumscribe judicial action. 
Thus, 'on Demand of the executive Authority,' Art. IV, § 2, of a State it is 
the duty of a sister State to deliver up a fugitive from justice. But the 
fulfilment of this duty cannot be judicially enforced. Kentucky v. 
Dennison, 24 How. 66. The duty to see to it that the laws are faithfully 
executed cannot be brought under legal compulsion, Mississippi v. John-
son, 4 Wall. 475. Violation of the great guaranty of a republican form of 
government in States cannot be challenged in the courts. Pacific Tele-
phone Co. v. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118. The Constitution has left the perfor-
mance of many duties in our governmental scheme to depend on the fidelity 
of the executive and legislative action and, ultimately, on the vigilance of 
the people in exercising their political rights." 328 U. S., at 553-554, 556. 
6 The districts ranged in population from 112,000 to 900,000 persons. 







to the constitutionality of a 1901 districting statute, it held 
that the political question doctrine did not foreclose judicial 
review. Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186. That decision repre-
sents one of the great landmarks in the history of this Court's 
jurisprudence. 
Two aspects of the Court's opinion in Baker v. Carr are of 
special relevance to the case the Court decides today. First, 
the Court's scholarly review of the political question doctrine 
focused on the dominant importance of satisfactory standards 
for judicial determination. 7 Second, the Court's articulation 
of the relevant constitutional standard made no reference to 
subjective intent. 8 The host of cases that have arisen in the 
7 The Court stated that the "nonjusticiability of a political question is 
primarily a function of the separation of powers." 369 U. S., at 210. It 
emphasized, however, that "the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial 
determination" was a dominant consideration in Coleman v. Miller, 307 
U. S. 433, 454-455; that whether a foreign relations question is justiciable 
turns, in part, on "its susceptibility to judicial handling"; that in the pres-
ence of clearly definable criteria for decision "the political question barrier 
falls away"; and that "even in private litigation which directly implicates no 
feature of separation of powers, lack of judicially discoverable standards 
and the drive for even-handed application may impel reference to the politi-
cal departments' determination of dates of hostilities' beginning and end-
ing." 369 U. S., at 210, 211, 214. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, was dis-
tinguished, in part, because that case involved "the lack of criteria by 
which a court could determine which form of government was republican"; 
the Court stated that "the only significance that Luther could have for our 
immediate purposes is in its holding that the Guaranty Clause is not a 
repository of judicially manageable standards which a court could utilize in-
dependently in order to identify a State's lawful government." 369 U. S., 
at 222, 223. In concluding that the reapportionment question before it 
was justiciable, the Court emphasized that it would not be necessary "to 
enter upon policy determinations for which judicia)ly manageable stand-
ards are lacking." ld., at 226. 
• The Court simply stated: 
"Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed 
and familiar, and it has been open to courts since the enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, 







wake of Baker v. Carr have shared these two characteristics. 
They have formulated, refined, and applied a judicially man-
ageable standard that has become known as the one-person, 
one-vote rule; they have attached no significance to the sub-
jective intent of the decisionmakers who adopted or main-
tained the official rule under attack. 
In approaching the novel case it decides today, the Court 
assumes that the governing standard for decision has been 
well established by our prior cases. The Court's approach is 
straightforward; it simply states that "a showing of discrimi-
natory intent has long been required in all types of cases aris-
ing under the Equal Protection Clause." Ante, at 4 (empha-
sis in original). This blanket assertion is simply incorrect. 9 
For the Court has repeatedly identified the criteria for deter-
mining whether a law violates the Equal Protection Clause 
without any reference to subjective motivation. 10 
action." Id., at 226. 
• As noted above, the many cases applying the one-person, one-vote rule 
arose under the Equal Protection Clause and did not involve a showing of 
discriminatory intent. Unequal districts must be reapportioned whether 
they are the product of unanticipated shifts in population or an attempt to 
dilute the voting power of minority citizens. 
1° For example, in his opinion for the Court in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
U. S. 330, 335, JUSTICE MARSHALL wrote: 
"To decide whether a law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we look, 
in essence, to three things: the character of the classification in question; 
the individual interests affected by the classification; and the governmental 
interests asserted in support of the classification." 
And in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, at the outset of its analysis of the 
question whether Ohio election laws impairing a new political party's ac-
cess to the state ballot violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Court 
stated: 
"In determining whether or not a state law violates the Equal Protection 
Clause, we must consider the facts and circumstances behind the law, the 
interests which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those 
who are disadvantaged by the classification." I d., at 30. 
In sum, the standard by which an equal protection challenge is measured 
cannot be determined without identifying the substantive right that the 
• i . 
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In reviewing the constitutionality of the structure of a local 
government, two quite different methods of analysis could be 
employed. The Court might identify the specific features of 
the government that raise constitutional concerns and decide 
whether, singly or in combination, they are valid. This is 
the approach the Court has used in testing the constitutional-
ity of rules conditioning the right to vote on payment of a poll 
tax, 11 imposing burdens on independent candidates, 12 denying 
new residents or members of the Armed Forces the right to 
vote, 13 prohibiting cross-overs in party primaries, 14 requiring 
political candidates to pay filing fees, 15 and disadvantaging 
minority parties in presidential elections. 16 In none of these 
standard is designed to protect. If the right is merely a right to be free 
from improper motivations, a subjective standard obviously is appropriate. 
But if the Equal Protection Clause provides certain rights that are inde-
pendent of motivation-such as the right to have one's vote count the same 
as that of any other voter, see n. 9, supra-than a subjective standard 
clearly is not appropriate. See n. 24, infra. 
11 Hmper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663. The Court 
concluded that "a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or pay-
ment of any fee an electoral standard. Voter qualifications have no rela-
tion to wealth nor to paying or not paying this or any other tax." Id., at 
666. "To introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter's 
qualifications is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor." !d., at 668. 
In dissent, Justice Black noted: "It should be pointed out at once that the 
Court's decision is to no extent based on a finding that the Virginia law as 
written or applied is being used as a device or mechanism to deny Negro 
citizens of Virginia the right to vote on account of their color." !d., at 672. 
12 Storer v. B1'0wn, 415 U. S. 724. The Court stated that, in determin-
ing the constitutionality of eligibility requirements for independent candi-
dates, the "inevitable question for judgment" is "could a reasonably dili-
gent independent candidate be expected to satisfy the signature 
requirements, or will it be only rarely that the unaffiliated candidate will 
succeed in getting on the ballot?" Id., at 742. See Mandel v. Bradley, 
432 U. S. 173, 177; id., at 181 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). See also Ameri-
can Party of Texas v. White, 415 U. S. 767, 795. 
13 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330; Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89. 
14 Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U. S. 51. 
15 Lubin v. Panish, 415 U. S. 709; Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134. 
16 Willimas v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23. 
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cases did the validity of the electoral procedure turn on 
whether the legislators who enacted the rule subjectively in-
tended to discriminate against minority voters. Under the 
approach employed by the Court in those cases, the objective 
circumstances that led to a declaration that an election proce-
dure was unconstitutional would invalidate a similar law 
wherever it might be found. 
Alternatively, the Court could employ a subjective ap-
proach under which the constitutionality of a challenged pro-
cedure depends entirely on federal judges' appraisals of the 
reasons why particular localities have chosen to govern them-
selves in a particular way. The Constitution would simply 
protect a right to have an electoral machinery established 
and maintained without the influence of impermissible fac-
tors. Constitutional challenges to identical procedures in 
neighboring communities could produce totally different re-
sults, for the subjective motivations of the legislators who en-
acted the procedures-or at least the admissible evidence 
that might be discovered concerning such motivation-could 
be quite different. 
In deciding the question presented in this case, the Court 
abruptly rejects the former approach and considers only the 
latter. It starts from the premise that Burke County's at-
large method of electing its five county commissioners is, on 
its face, unobjectionable. The otherwise valid system is un-
constitutional, however, because it makes it more difficult for 
the minority to elect commissioners and because the majority 
that is now in power has maintained the system for that very 
reason. Two factors are apparently of critical importance: 
(1) the intent of the majority to maintain control; and (2) the 
racial character of the minority. 
I am troubled by each aspect of the Court's analysis. In 
my opinion, the question whether Burke County's at-large 
system may survive scrutiny under a purely objective analy-




suming, however, that the system is otherwise valid, I do not 
believe that the subjective intent of the persons who adopted 
the system in 1911, or the intent of those who have since de-
clined to change it, can determine its constitutionality. 
Even if the intent of the political majority were the control-
ling constitutional consideration, I could not agree that the 
only political groups that are entitled to protection under the 
Court's rule are those defined by racial characteristics. 
II 
At-large voting systems generally tend to maximize the po-
litical power of the majority. See ante, at 3Y There are, 
17 In the words of Chancellor Kent, the requirement of districting "was 
recommended by the wisdom and justice of giving, as far as possible, to the 
local subdivisions of the people of each state, a due influence in the choice of 
representatives, so as not to leave the aggregate minority of the people in a 
state, though approaching perhaps to a majority, to be wholly overpow-
ered by the combined action of the numerical majority, without any voice 
whatever in the national councils." 1 Kent, Commentaries (12th ed., 
1873) *230-231, n. (c). See also Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 105, n. 3 
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 158-160. 
The challenge to multimember or at-large districts is, of course, quite 
different from the challenge to the value of individual votes considered in 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533. An at-large system is entirely consist-
ent with the one-person, one-vote rule developed in that case. As Justice 
Stewart noted in Mobile, in considering the applicability of Reynolds and 
the cases that followed it: 
"Those cases established that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the 
right of each voter to 'have his vote weighted equally with those of all other 
citizens.' 377 U. S., at 576. The Court recognized that a voter's right to 
'have an equally effective voice' in the election of representatives is im-
paired where representation is not apportioned substantially on a popula-
tion basis. In such cases, the votes of persons in more populous districts 
carry less weight than do those of persons in smaller districts. There can 
be, of course, no claim that the 'one person, one vote' principle has been 
violated in this case, because the city of Mobile is a unitary electoral dis-
trict and the Commission elections are conducted at large. It is therefore 
obvious that nobody's vote had been 'diluted' in the sense in which that 




however, many types of at-large electoral schemes. Three 
features of Burke County's electoral system are noteworthy, 
not in my opinion because they shed special light on the sub-
jective intent of certain unidentified people, but rather be-
cause they make it especially difficult for a minority candi-
date to win an election. First, although the qualifications 
and the duties of the office are identical for all five commis-
sioners, each runs for a separately designated position. 18 
Second, in order to be elected, each commissioner must re-
ceive a majority of all votes cast in the primary and in the 
general election; if the leading candidate receives only a plu-
rality, a run-off election must be held. Third, there are no 
residency requirements; thus, all candidates could reside in a 
single, all-white neighborhood. 19 
Even if one assumes that a system of local government in 
which power is concentrated in the hands of a small group of 
persons elected from the community at large is an accept-
able-or perhaps even a preferred-form of municipal gov-
ernment, 20 it is not immediately apparent that these addi-
opinion). 
See also id., at 83 (STEVENS, J., concurring). 
18 This feature distinguishes Burke County's at-large electoral system 
from the municipal commission form of government popularized by reform-
ers shortly after the turn of the century and known as the Galveston Plan 
or the Des Moines Plan. See n. 20, infra. 
"Other features of certain at-large electoral schemes that make it more 
difficult for a minority group to elect a favored candidate when bloc voting 
occurs-prohibitions against cumulative and incomplete voting-are not in-
volved in this case. Prohibitions against cumulative or partial voting are 
generally, inapplicable in electoral schemes involving numbered posts. 
20 "During its evolution as a progressive solution to municipal problems, 
the commission format was variously known as the Galveston plan, the 
Texas idea, and the Des Moines plan. Since Galveston invented the basic 
organization and Des Moines popularized the addition of related reform 
techniques, the new type of government is probably best described as the 
Galveston-Des Moines plan. So popular did the new idea become that 




tional features that help to perpetuate the power of an 
entrenched majority are either desireable or legitimate. 21 If 
the only purpose these features serve-particularly when 
viewed in combination-is to assist a dominant party to main-
tain its political power, they are no more legitimate than the 
Tennessee districts described in Baker v. Carr as "no policy, 
but simply arbitrary and capricious action." 369 U. S., at 
226 (emphasis in original). Unless these features are inde-
pal innovation if they used the commission plan. Consequently, some cit-
ies boasted that they had the system, knowing full well that their charters 
had little resemblance to Galveston's. But there were certain essentials 
necessary before a city could claim commission status. Benjamin DeWitt, 
an early historian of the progressive movement, explained: 
"In every case, however, no matter how much charters may differ as to 
minor details, they have certain fundamental features in common. These 
fundamental features of commission charters are four: 
"1. Authority and responsibility are centralized. 
"2. The number of men in whom this authority and this responsibility 
are vested is small. 
"3. These few men are elected from the city at large and not by wards or 
districts. 
"4. Each man is at the head of a single department. 
"The most radical departure the new scheme made was the combination 
of legislative and executive functions in one body. The plan disregarded 
the federal model of separation of powers. Sitting together, the commis-
sion was a typical policy- and ordinance-making council; but, separately, 
each commissioner administered a specific department on a day-to-day 
basis. The original Galveston charter provided for a mayor-president plus 
commissioners of finance and revenue, waterworks and sewerage, streets 
and public property, and fire and police. Later commission cities followed 
a similar division of responsibility." Rice, Progressive Cities: The Com-
mission Government Movement in America, 1901-1920, pp. xiii-xiv (Univ. 
of Texas Press 1977). 
" It is noteworthy that these features apparently characterize many 
governmental units in jurisdictions that have been subjected to the stric-
tures of the Voting Rights Act as the result of prior practices that excluded 
black citizens from the electoral process. See generally, The Voting 
Rights Act: Unfulfilled Goals, A Report of the United States Commission 





pendently justified, they may be invalid simply because there 
is no legitimate justification for their impact on minority par-
ticipation in elections. 22 
In this case, appellees have not argued-presumably be-
cause they assumed that this Court's many references to the 
requirement of proving an improper motive in equal protec-
tion cases are controlling in this new context-that the spe-
cial features of Burke County's at-large system have such an 
adverse impact on the minority's opportunity to participate in 
the political process that this type of government deprives 
the minority of equal protection of the law. Nor have the 
appellants sought to identify legitimate local policies that 
might justify the use of such rules. As a result, this record 
does not provide an adequate basis for determining the valid-
ity of Burke County's governmental structure on the basis of 
traditional objective standards. 23 
If the governmental structure were itself found to lack a 
legitimate justification, inquiry into subjective intent would 
clearly be unnecessary. As JUSTICE MARSHALL stated in 
22 No group has a right to proportional representation. See Mobile v. 
Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 75-76 (plurality opinion); id., at 122 (MARSHALL, J., 
dissenting). But in a representative democracy, meaningful participation 
by minority groups in the electoral process is essential to ensure that rep-
resentative bodies are responsive to the entire electorate. For this rea-
son, a challenged electoral procedure may not be justified solely on the 
ground that it serves to reduce the ability of a minority group to partici-
pate effectively in the electoral process. 
23 The record nevertheless does indicate that the validity of the at-large 
system itself need not be decided in this case. For it is apparent that 
elimination of the majority run-off requirement and the numbered posts 
would enable a well-organized minority to elect one or two candidates to 
the county board. That consequence could be achieved without replacing 
the at-large system itself with five single-member districts. In other 
words, minority access to the political process could be effected by invali-
dating specific rules that impede that access and without changing the ba-
sic structure of the local governmental unit. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 
U. S. 55, 80 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring). 









his dissent in Mobile: "Whatever may be the merits of apply-
ing motivational analysis to the allocation of constitutionally 
gratuitous benefits, that approach is completely misplaced 
where, as here, it is applied to the distribution of a constitu-
tionally protected interest." 446 U. S., at 121.24 Under the 
Court's analysis, however, the characteristics of the particu-
lar form of government under attack are virtually irrelevant; 
the Court states that a showing of discriminatory intent is re-
quired in all equal protection cases. Ante, at 4. Thus, not 
only would the Court's approach uphold an arbitrary-but 
not invidious-system that lacked independent justification, 
it would invalidate-if a discriminatory intent were proved-
a local rule that would be perfectly acceptable absent a show-
ing of invidious intent. The Court's standard applies not 
"'It is worth repeating the statement of Professor Ely noted by JUSTICE 
MARSHALL: 
"The danger I see is the somewhat different one that the Court, in its new-
found enthusiasm for motivation analysis, will seek to export it to fields 
where it has no business. It therefore cannot be emphasized too strongly 
that analysis of motivation is appropriate only to claims of improper dis-
crimination in the distribution of goods that are constitutionally gratuitous 
(that is, benefits to which people are not entitled as a matter of substantive 
constitutional right). In such cases the covert employment of a principle 
of selection that could not constitutionally be employed overtly is equally 
unconstitutional. However, where what is denied is something to which 
the complainant has a substantive constitutional right-either because it 
is granted by the terms of the Constitution, or because it is essential to the 
effective functioning of a democratic government-the reasons it was de-
nied are irrelevant. It may become important in court what justifications 
counsel for the state can articulate in support of its denial or non-provision, 
but the reasons that actually inspired the denial never can: To have a right 
to something is to have a claim on it irrespective of why it is denied. It 
would be a tragedy of the first order were the Court to expand its burgeon-
ing awareness of the relevance of motivation into the thoroughly mistaken 
notion that a denial of a constitutional right does not count as such unless it 
was intentional." Ely, The Centrality and Limits of Motivation Analysis, 
15 San Diego L. Rev. 1155, 1160-1161 (1978) (emphasis in original) (foot-
notes omitted). 
t __ --· --· ----·-·- ___________ , ____ . __ 
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only to Burke County and to multimember districts, but to 
any other form of government as well. 
III 
Ever since I joined the Court, I have been concerned about 
the Court's emphasis on subjective intent as a criterion for 
constitutional adjudication. 25 Although that criterion is often 
regarded as a restraint on the exercise of judicial power, it 
may in fact provide judges with a tool for exercising power 
that otherwise would be confined to the legislature. 2ti My 
principal concern with the subjective intent standard, how-
ever, is unrelated to the quantum of power it confers upon 
the judiciary. It is based on the quality of that power. For 
in the long run constitutional adjudication that is premised on 
a case-by-case appraisal of the subjective intent of local 
decisionmakers cannot possibly satisfy the requirement of 
impartial administration of the law that is embodied in the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The facts of this case illustrate the ephemeral character of 
a constitutional standard that focuses on subjective intent. 
When the suit was filed in 1976, approximately 58 percent of 
25 In Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, I wrote: 
"Frequently the most probative evidence of intent will be objective evi-
dence of what actually happened rather than evidence describing the sub-
jective state of mind of the actor. For normally the actor is presumed to 
have intended the natural consequences of his deeds. This is particularly 
true in the case of governmental action which is frequently the product of 
compromise, of collective decisionmaking, and of mixed motivation. It is 
unrealistic, on the one hand, to require the victim of alleged discrimination 
to uncover the actual subjective intent of the decision maker or, conversely, 
to invalidate otherwise legitimate action simply because an improper mo-
tive affected the deliberation of a participant in the decisional process. A 
law conscripting clerics should not be invalidated because an atheist voted 
for it." Id., at 253 (concurring opinion). 
26 See Miller, If "The Devil Himself Knows Not the Mind of Man," How 
Possibly Can Judges Know the Motivation of Legislators? 15 San Diego 







the population of Burke County was black and approximately 
42 percent was white. Because black citizens had been de-
nied access to the political process-through means that have 
since been outlawed by the Voting Rights Act of 1965-and 
because there had been insufficient time to enable the reg-
istration of black voters to overcome the history of past injus-
tice, the majority of registered voters in the county were 
white. The at-large electoral system therefore served, as a 
result of the presence of bloc voting, to maintain white con-
trol of the local government. Whether it would have contin-
ued to do so would have depended on a mix of at least three 
different factors-the continuing increase in voter registra-
tion among blacks, the continuing exodus of black residents 
from the county, and the extent to which racial bloc voting 
continued to dominate local politics. 
If those elected officials in control of the political machin-
ery had formed the judgment that these factors created a 
likelihood that a bloc of black voters was about to achieve suf-
ficient strength to elect an entirely new administration, they 
might have decided to abandon the at-large system and sub-
stitute five single-member districts with the boundary lines 
drawn to provide a white majority in three districts and a 
black majority in only two. Under the Court's intent stand-
ard, such a change presumably would violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment. It is ironic that the remedy ordered by the 
District Court fits that pattern precisely. 27 
"'The following table shows a breakdown of the population of the dis-







Voting Age Black Voting Age White Voting Age 
Population Population (%) Population (%) 
2,048 1,482 (72.4) 556 (27.6) 
2,029 1,407 (69.3) 622 (30. 7) 
2,115 978 (46.2) 1,137 (53.8) 
2,112 947 (44.6) 1,175 (55.4) 
2,217 803 (36.2) 1,414 (63.8) 
See Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F. 2d 1358, 1361, n. 4 (CA5 1981). 
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If votes continue to be cast on a racial basis, the judicial 
remedy virtually guarantees that whites will continue to con-
trol a majority of seats on the county board. It is at least 
possible that white control of the political machinery has been 
frozen by judicial decree at a time when increased black voter 
registration might have led to a complete change of adminis-
tration. Since the federal judge's intent was unquestionably 
benign rather than invidious-and, unlike that of state offi-
cials, is presumably not subject in any event to the Court's 
standard-that result has been accomplished without violat-
ing the Federal Constitution. 
In the future, it is not inconceivable that the white officials 
who are likely to remain in power under the District Court's 
plan will desire to perpetuate that system and to continue to 
control a majority of seats on the county commission. Under 
this Court's standard, if some of those officials harbor such an 
intent for an "invidious" reason, the District Court's plan will 
itself become unconstitutional. It is not clear whether the 
invidious intent would have to be shared by all three white 
commissioners, by merely a majority of two, or by simply one 
if he were influential. It is not clear whether the issue would 
be affected by the intent of the two black commissioners, who 
might fear that a return to an at-large system would under-
mine the certainty of two black seats. 28 Of course, if the sub-
jective intent of these officials were such as to mandate a 
change to a governmental structure that would permit black 
voters to elect an all-black commission-and if black voters 
did so-those black officials could not harbor an intent to 
"'In Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52, a group of minority voters in 
New York City challenged a districting scheme that placed most minority 
voters in one of four districts. They sought "a more even distribution of 
minority groups among the four congressional districts." /d., at 58. Con-
gressman Adam Clayton Powell intervened in the lawsuit and argued 
strenuously "that the kind of districts for which appellants contended 
would be undesirable and, because based on race or place of origin, would 




maintain the system to keep whites from returning to power. 
In sum, as long as racial consciousness exists in Burke 
County, its governmental structure is subject to attack. 
Perhaps those more familiar than I with political maneuver-
ing will be able to identify with greater accuracy and reliabil-
ity those subjective intentions that are legitimate and those 
that are not. Because judges may not possess such exper-
tise, however, I am afraid the Court is planting seeds that 
may produce an unexpected harvest. 
The costs and the doubts associated with litigating ques-
tions of motive, which are often significant in routine trials, 
will be especially so in cases involving the "motives" of legis-
lative bodies. 29 Often there will be no evidence that the gov-
ernmental system was adopted for a discriminatory reason. 30 
29 Professor Karst has strongly criticized motivational analysis on the 
ground that it is inadequate to protect black citizens from unconstitutional 
conduct: 
"[E]ven though the proof will center on the effects of what officials have 
done, the ultimate issue will be posed in terms of the goodness or the evil of 
the officials' hearts. Courts have long regarded such inquiries as un-
seemly, as the legislative investigation cases of the 1950's attest. The 
principal concern here is not that tender judicial sensitivities may be 
bruised, but that a judge's reluctance to challenge the purity of other offi-
cials' motives may cause her to fail to recognize valid claims of racial dis-
crimination even when the motives for governmental action are highly sus-
pect. Because an individual's behavior results from the interaction of a 
multitude of motives, and because racial attitudes often operate at the mar-
gin of consciousness, in any given case there almost certainly will be an 
opportunity for a governmental official to argue that his action was 
prompted by racially neutral considerations. When that argument is 
made, should we not expect the judge to give the officials the benefit of the 
moral doubt? When the governmental action is the product of a group de-
cision, will not that tendency toward generosity be heightened?" Karst, 
The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 San Diego L. Rev. 1163, 
1164-1165 (1978) (footnote omitted). 
To reject an examination into subjective intent is not to rule that the rea-
sons for legislative action are irrelevant. "In my opinion, customary indi-
cia of legislative intent provide an adequate basis for ascertaining the pur-




The reform movement in municipal government, see n. 20, 
supra, or an attempt to comply with the strictures of Reyn-
olds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, may account for the enactment of 
countless at-large systems. In such a case the question be-
comes whether the system was maintained for a discrimina-
tory purpose. Whose intentions control? Obviously not the 
voters, although they may be most responsible for the atti-
tudes and actions of local government. 31 Assuming that it is 
the intentions of the "state actors" that is critical, how will 
their mental processes be discovered? Must a specific pro-
posal for change be defeated? What if different motives are 
held by different legislators or, indeed, by a single official? 
Is a selfish desire to stay in office sufficient to justify a failure 
to change a governmental system? 
The Court avoids these problems by failing to answer the 
very question that its standard asks. Presumably, accord-
legislature and its committees, the effect of the measure as evidenced by 
its text, the historical setting in which it was enacted, and the public acts 
and deeds of its sponsors and opponents, provide appropriate evidence of 
legislative purpose." Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F. 2d 830, 
856 (CA7 1972) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). If a challenged law disad-
vantages minority citizens and its justifications-as evidenced by custom-
ary indicia of legislative intent-are insufficient to persuade a neutral ob-
server that the law was enacted for legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons, j 
it is, in my opinion, invalid. 
30 As the Court of Appeals noted: "The general election laws in many ju-
risdictions were originally adopted at a time when Blacks had not received 
their franchise. No one disputes that such laws were not adopted to 
achieve an end, the exclusion of Black voting, that was the status quo. 
Other states' election laws, though adopted shortly after the enactment of 
the Fifteenth Amendment, are so old that whatever evidence of discrimi-
natory intent may have existed, has long since disappeared. This case 
falls within that category. The focus then becomes the existence of a dis-
criminatory purpose for the maintenance of such a system." 639 F. 2d, at 
1363, n. 7. 
3
' Apart from the lack of "state action," the very purpose of the secret 
ballot is to protect the individual's right to cast a vote without explaining to 
anyone for whom, or for what reason, the vote is cast . 
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ing to the Court's analysis, the Burke County governmental 
structure is unconstitutional because it was maintained at 
some point for an invidious purpose. Yet the Court scarcely 
identifies the manner in which changes to a county govern-
mental structure are made. There is no reference to any un-
successful attempt to replace the at-large system with single-
member districts. It is incongruous that subjective intent is 
identified as the constitutional standard and yet the persons 
who allegedly harbored an improper intent are never identi-
fied or mentioned. Undoubtedly, the evidence relied on by 
the Court proves that racial prejudice has played an impor-
tant role in the history of Burke County and has motivated 
many wrongful acts by various community leaders. But un-
less that evidence is sufficient to prove that every govern-
mental action was motivated by a racial animus--and may be 
remedied by a federal court-the Court has failed under its 
own test to demonstrate that the governmental structure of 
Burke County was maintained for a discriminatory purpose. 
Certainly governmental action should not be influenced by 
irrelevant considerations. I am not convinced, however, 
that the Constitution affords a right-and this is the only 
right the Court finds applicable in this case-to have every 
official decision made without the influence of considerations 
that are in some way "discriminatory." Is the failure of a 
state legislature to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment 
invalid if a federal judge concludes that a majority of the leg-
islators harbored stereotypical views of the proper role of 
women in society? Is the establishment of a memorial for 
Jews slaughtered in World War II unconstitutional if civic 
leaders believe that their cause is more meritorious than that 
of victimized Palestinian refugees? Is the failure to adopt a 
state holiday for Martin Luther King, Jr. invalid if it is 
proved that state legislators believed that he does not de-
serve to be commemorated? Is the refusal to provide Medic-
---------- ·- -- --------- ---
.. 
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aid funding for abortions unconstitutional if officials intend to 
discriminate against women who would abort a fetus? 32 
A rule that would invalidate all governmental action moti-
vated by racial, ethnic or political considerations is too broad. 
Moreover, in my opinion the Court is incorrect in assuming 
that the intent of elected officials is invidious when they are 
motivated by a desire to retain control of the local political 
machinery. For such an intent is surely characteristic of 
politicians throughout the country. In implementing that 
sort of purpose, dominant majorities have used a wide vari-
ety of techniques to limit the political strength of aggressive 
minorities. In this case the minority is defined by racial 
characteristics, but minority groups seeking an effective po-
litical voice can, of course, be identified in many other ways. 
The Hasidic Jews in Kings County, New York, 33 the Puerto 
Ricans in Chicago, 34 the Spanish-speaking citizens in Dallas, 35 
the Bohemians in Cedar Rapids, 36 the Federalists in Massa-
32 A stereotypical reaction to particular characteristics of a disfavored 
group cannot justify discriminatory legislation. See, e. g., Matthews v. 
Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 520-521 (STEVENS, J ., dissenting). It is neverthe-
less important to remember that the First Amendment protects an individ-
ual's right to entertain unsound and unpopular beliefs-including stereo-
typical beliefs about classes of persons-and to expound those beliefs 
publicly. There is a vast difference between rejecting an irrational belief 
as a justification for discriminatory legislation and concluding that neutral 
legislation is invalid because it was motivated by an irrational belief. 
Fresh air and open discussion are better cures for vicious prejudice than 
are secrecy and dissembling. No matter how firmly I might disagree with 
a legislator's motivation in casting a biased vote, I not only must respect 
his right to form his own opinions, cf. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 
427 U. S. 50, 63 (opinion of STEVENS, J.), but also would prefer a candid 
explanation of those opinions to a litigation-oriented silence. 
33 See United Jewish Organization v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144. 
34 See Cousins v. City Council of Chicago , 466 F. 2d 830 (CA7 1972), 
cert. denied, 409 U. S. 893. 
85 See White v. R egester, 412 U. S. 755. 
36 See Rice, Progressive Cities: The Commission Government Movement 




chusetts,:n the Democrats in Indiana, 38 and the Republicans in 
California 39 have all been disadvantaged by deliberate politi-
cal maneuvers by the dominant majority. As I have stated, 
a device that serves no purpose other than to exclude minor-
ity groups from effective political participation is unlawful 
under objective standards. But if a political majority's in-
tent to maintain control of a legitimate local government is 
sufficient to invalidate any electoral device that makes it 
more difficult for a minority group to elect candidates-re-
gardless of the nature of the interest that gives the minority 
group cohesion-the Court is not just entering a "political 
thicket"; it is entering a vast wonderland of judicial review of 
political activity. 
The obvious response to this suggestion is that this case in-
volves a racial group and that governmental decisions that 
disadvantage such a group must be subject to special scrutiny 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. I therefore must con-
sider whether the Court's holding can legitimately be con-
fined to political groups that are identified by racial 
characteristics. 
IV 
Governmental action that discriminates between individ-
uals on the basis of their race is, at the very least, presump-
tively irrational. 4° For an individual's race is virtually al-
ways irrelevant to his right to enjoy the benefits and to share 
37 The term "gerrymander" arose from an election district-that took the 
shape of a salamander-formed in Massachusetts by Governor Elbridge 
Gerry's Jeffersonian or Democratic-Republican Party. The phrase was 
coined by Gerry's opponents, the Federalists. 
38 See Congressional Quarterly, May 2, 1981, p. 758. 
39 See Congressional Quarterly, May 30, 1981, p. 941. 
'
0 Since I do not understand the Court's opinion to rely on an affirmative 
action rationale, I put that entire subject to one side. If that were the 
rationale for the Court's holding, however, there would be no need to in-




the responsibilities of citizenship in a democratic society. 
Persons of different races, like persons of different religious 
faiths and different political beliefs, are equal in the eyes of 
the law. 
Groups of every character may associate together to 
achieve legitimate common goals. If they voluntarily iden-
tify themselves by a common interest in a specific issue, by a 
common ethnic heritage, by a common religious belief, or by 
their race, that characteristic assumes significance as the 
bond that gives the group cohesion and political strength. 
When referring to different kinds of political groups, this 
Court has consistently indicated that, to borrow JUSTICE 
BRENNAN's phrasing, the Equal Protection Clause does not 
make some groups of citizens more equal than others. See 
Zobel v. Williams,-- U.S.--,-- (BRENNAN, J., con-
curring). Thus, the Court has considered challenges to dis-
crimination based on "differences of color, race, nativity, reli-
gious opinions [or] political affiliations," American Sugar 
Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 92; to redistricting 
plans that serve "to further racial or economic discrimination, 
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 149; to biases "tending to 
favor particular political interests or geographic areas." 
Abate v. Mundt, 403 U. S. 182, 187. Indeed, in its opinion 
today the Court recognizes that the practical impact of the 
electoral system at issue applies equally to any "distinct mi-
nority, whether it be a racial, ethnic, economic, or political 
group." Ante, at 3. 
A constitutional standard that gave special protection to 
political groups identified by racial characteristics would be 
inconsistent with the basic tenet of the Equal Protection 
Clause. Those groups are no more or no less able to pursue 
their interests in the political arena than are groups defined 
by other characteristics. Nor can it be said that racial alli-
ances are so unrelated to political action that any electoral de-
cision that is influenced by racial consciousness-as opposed 
to other forms of political consciousness-is inherently ir-
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rational. For it is the very political power of a racial or eth-
nic group that creates a danger that an entrenched majority 
will take action contrary to the group's political interests. 
"The mere fact that a number of citizens share a common eth-
nic, racial, or religious background does not create the need 
for protection against gerrymandering. It is only when their 
common interests are strong enough to be manifested in po-
litical action that the need arises. Thus the characteristic of 
the group which creates the need for protection is its political 
character." Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F. 2d 
830, 852 (CA7 1972) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). It would be 
unrealistic to distinguish racial groups from other political 
groups on the ground that race is an irrelevant factor in the 
political process. 
Racial consciousness and racial association are not desir-
able features of our political system. We all look forward to 
the day when race is an irrelevant factor in the political proc-
ess. In my opinion, however, that goal will best be achieved 
by eliminating the vestiges of discrimination that motivate 
disadvantaged racial and ethnic groups to vote as identifiable 
units. Whenever identifiable groups of our society are dis-
advantaged, they will share common political interests and 
tend to vote as a "bloc." In this respect, racial groups are 
like other political groups. A permanent constitutional rule 
that treated them differently would, in my opinion, itself 
tend to perpetuate race as a feature distinct from all others; a 
trait that makes persons different in the eyes of the law. 
Such a rule would delay-rather than advance-the goal ad-
vocated by Justice Douglas: 
"When racial or religious lines are drawn by the State, 
the multiracial, multireligious communities that our Con-
stitution seeks to weld together as one become separat-
ist; antagonisms that relate to race or to religion rather 
than to political issues are generated; communities seek 






gious partisan. Since that system is at war with the 
democratic ideal, it should find no footing here." Wright 
v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52, 67 (dissenting opinion). 
My conviction that all minority groups are equally entitled 
to constitutional protection against the misuse of the major-
ity's political power does not mean that I would abandon judi-
cial review of such action. As I have written before, a ger-
rymander as grotesque as the boundaries condemned in 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 264 U. S. 339, is intolerable whether 
it fences out black voters, Republican voters, or Irish-Catho-
lic voters. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 86 (concurring 
opinion). But if the standard the Court applies today ex-
tends to all types of minority groups, it is either so broad that 
virtually every political device is vulnerable or it is so unde-
fined that federal judges can pick and choose almost at will 
among those that will be upheld and those that will be con-
demned. 
There are valid reasons for concluding that certain minor-
ity groups-such as the black voters in Burke County, Geor-
gia-should be given special protection from political oppres-
sion by the dominant majority. But those are reasons that 
justify the application of a legislative policy choice rather 
than a constitutional principle that cannot be confined to spe-
cial circumstances or to a temporary period in our history. 
Any suggestion that political groups in which black leader-
ship predominates are in need of a permanent constitutional 
shield against the tactics of their political opponents underes-
timates the resourcefulness, the wisdom, and the demon-
strated capacity of such leaders. I cannot accept the Court's 
constitutional holding. 41 
41 The Court does not address the statutory question whether the at-
large system violates § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Neither the 
District Court nor the Court of Appeals considered this issue. Since ap-
pellees have been granted full relief by the Court, I express no opinion on 
their statutory claims. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins, 
dissenting. 
I 
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980), establishes that an 
at-large voting system must be upheld against constitutional 
attack unless maintained for a discriminatory purpose. In 
Mobile we reversed a finding of unconstitutional vote dilution 
because the lower courts had relied on factors insufficient as 
a matter of law to establish discriminatory intent. See 446 
U. S., at 73 (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.). The District 
Court and Court of Appeals in this case based their findings 
of unconsitutional discrimination on the same factors held in-
sufficient in Mobile. Yet the Court now finds their conclu-
sion unexceptionable. The Mobile plurality also affirmed 
that the concept of "intent" was no mere fiction, and held that 
the District Court had erred in "its failure to identify the 
state officials whose intent it considered relevant." I d., at 
74 n. 20. Although the courts below did not answer that 
question in this case, the Court today affirms their decision. 
Whatever the wisdom of Mobile, the Court's opinion can-
not be reconciled persuasively with that case. There are 
some variances in the largely sociological evidence presented 
in the two cases. But Mobile held that this kind of evidence 
) 




was not enough. Such evidence, we found in Mobile, did not 
merely fall short, but "fell jar short[,] of showing that [an at-
large electoral scheme was] 'conceived or operated [as a] pur-
poseful devic[e] to further racial ... discrimination."' ld., 
at 70 (emphasis added), quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 
U. S. 124, 149 (1971). Because I believe that Mobile con-
trols this case, I dissent. 
II 
The Court's decision today relies heavily on the capacity of 
the federal district courts-essentially free from any stand-
ards propounded by this Court-to determine whether at-
large voting systems are "being maintained for the invidious 
purpose of diluting the voting strength of the black popula-
tion." Ante, at 9. Federal courts thus are invited to en-
gage in deeply subjective inquiries into the motivations of 
local officials in structuring local governments. Inquiries of 
this kind not only can be "unseemly," see Karst, The Costs of 
Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 San Diego Law Rev. 1163, 1164 
(1978); they intrude the federal courts-with only the vagu-
est constitutional direction-into an area of intensely local 
and political concern. 
Emphasizing these considerations, JUSTICE STEVENS, 
post, at --, argues forcefully that the Court's focus of in-
quiry is seriously mistaken. I agree with much of what he 
says. As I do not share his views entirely, however, I 
write separately. 
A 
As I understand it, JUSTICE STEVENS's critique of the 
Court's approach rests on three principles with which I am in 
fundamental agreement. 
First, it is appropriate to distinguish between "state action 
that inhibits an individual's right to vote and state action that 
affects the political strength of various groups." Mobile v. 
Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 83 (STEVENS, J., concurring); see post, 




different from cases involving direct barriers to voting. 
There is no claim here that blacks may not register freely and 
vote for whom they choose. This case also differs from one-
man, one-vote cases, in which districting practices make a 
person's vote less weighty in some districts than in others. 
Second, I agree with JUSTICE STEVENS that vote dilution 
cases of this kind are difficult if not impossible to distin-
guish-especially in their remedial ·aspect-from other ac-
tions to redress gerrymanders. See post, at--. 
Finally, JUSTICE STEVENS clearly is correct in arguing 
that the standard used to identify unlawful racial discrimina-
tion in this area should be defined in terms that are judicially 
manageable and reviewable. See post, at --. In the ab-
sence of compelling reasons of both law and fact, the federal 
judiciary is unwarranted in undertaking to restructure state 
political systems. This is inherently a political area, where 
the identification of a seeming violation does not necessarily 
suggest an enforceable judicial remedy-or at least none 
short of a system of quotas or group representation. Any 
such system, of course, would be antithetical to the principles 
of our democracy. 
B 
JUSTICE STEVENS would accommodate these principles by 
holding that subjective intent is irrelevant to the establish-
ment of a case of racial vote dilution under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See post, at --. Despite sharing the con-
cerns from which his position is developed, I would not accept 
this view. "The central purpose of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of of-
ficial conduct discriminating on the basis of race." Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 242 (1976). Because I am un-
willing to abandon this central principle in cases of this kind, 
I cannot join JUSTICE STEVENS's opinion. 
Nonetheless, I do agree with him that what he calls "objec-
tive" factors should be the focus of inquiry in vote-dilution 
cases. Unlike the considerations on which the lower courts 
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relied in this case and in Mobile, the factors identified by Jus-
TICE STEVENS as "objective" in fact are direct, reliable, and 
unambiguous indices of discriminatory intent. If we held, as 
I think we should, that the district courts must place primary 
reliance on these factors to establish discriminatory intent, 
we would prevent federal court inquiries into the subjective 
thought processes of local officials-at least until enough ob-
jective evidence had been presented to warrant discovery 
into subjective motivations in this complex, politically 
charged area. By prescribing such a rule we would hold fed-
eral courts to a standard that was judicially manageable. 
And we would remain faithful to the central protective pur-
pose of the Equal Protection Clause. 
In the absence of proof of discrimination by reliance on the 
kind of objective factors identified by JUSTICE STEVENS, I 
would hold that the factors cited by the Court of Appeals are 
too attenuated as a matter of law to support an inference of 
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